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NOTES 
A BATTLE OF THE AMENDMENTS: 
WHY ENDING DISCRIMINATION 
IN THE COURTROOM MAY INHIBIT 
A CRIMINAL DEFENDANT’S RIGHT 
TO AN IMPARTIAL JURY 
Gina M. Chiappetta* 
 
Since the U.S. Supreme Court began limiting the exercise of peremptory 
challenges to safeguard potential jurors from discrimination, it has faced a 
nearly impossible task.  The Court has attempted to safeguard a juror’s 
equal protection rights without eradicating the peremptory challenge’s 
ability to preserve a criminal defendant’s right to an impartial jury.  Under 
the current legal framework, it is not certain whether either constitutional 
right is adequately protected.  This Note examines the history of the 
Supreme Court’s limitation on peremptory challenges.  It then discusses the 
current federal circuit split over whether peremptory challenges should be 
further limited.  Finally, this Note concludes that the existing framework’s 
application should be extended and restricted to more effectively protect the 
constitutional rights at issue. 
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INTRODUCTION 
James Kirkland Batson was an African American man charged with 
burglary and receipt of stolen goods.1  During voir dire proceedings prior to 
the start of his trial, the prosecutor used four of his six peremptory 
challenges to remove every African American from the venire.2  The result:  
Batson was convicted by an all-white jury.3 
By its definition, a peremptory strike is not “subject to the court’s 
control”—its exercise cannot be challenged.4  In 1986, however, when the 
U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the Kentucky Supreme Court’s decision to 
affirm Batson’s conviction, it imposed the first of many limitations on the 
exercise of peremptory challenges.5  Relying heavily on the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause, the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
this seminal case, Batson v. Kentucky,6 very narrowly.  It held that 
prosecutors could not exercise peremptory strikes against veniremen solely 
on the basis that they share the same race as the defendant.7 
Justice Thurgood Marshall did not have much faith in the Court’s 
solution, however.  He predicted that ending racial discrimination in the 
jury selection process would “be accomplished only by eliminating 
peremptory challenges entirely.”8  Three decades later, the peremptory 
challenge no longer lives up to its name.  In several attempts to temper the 
 1. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 82 (1986). 
 2. Id. at 83. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). 
 5. See infra Part I.B.2–3. 
 6. 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 7. Id. at 93–95. 
 8. Id. at 102–03 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
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discrimination peremptory challenges facilitate, Batson has been extended 
far beyond its original bounds.9  Now, civil and criminal litigants are 
prohibited from peremptorily dismissing a venireman based on their race or 
gender, regardless of whether the stricken juror shares the race or gender of 
a litigant.10  Whether or not Batson can be applied to further limit the 
procedure, however, is complicated. 
Batson’s scope has been narrowed so that peremptory challenges may be 
freely exercised against any group entitled to rational basis review under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.11  For example, race and gender, classifications 
entitled to heightened scrutiny, are unconstitutional bases for peremptory 
challenges.12  Mental handicap, on the other hand, is a permissible basis for 
a peremptory strike, as a classification only entitled to rational basis 
review.13  This limiting principle is not as easily applied, however, when it 
is unclear to which standard of review a group is entitled. 
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories,14 an antitrust dispute 
between two producers of HIV medication, demonstrates the confusion 
plaguing the Batson regime.15  The district court needed to decide whether 
a peremptory challenge against a homosexual member of the venire 
potentially violated Batson.16  SmithKline’s counsel argued that the “well-
known” presence of AIDS in the homosexual community motivated Abbott 
to exercise its peremptory challenge on the basis of the juror’s sexual 
orientation.17  The judge responded, “Well, I don’t know that, number one, 
whether Batson applies in civil, and number two, whether Batson ever 
applies to sexual orientation.”18  Ultimately, the Batson challenge was 
rejected.19  Yet, on appeal, the Ninth Circuit became the second circuit to 
recognize sexual orientation as a classification entitled to heightened 
scrutiny, and the first federal court to prohibit the exercise of peremptory 
challenges based on sexual orientation.20 
It is uncertain not only whether the Batson regime permits such a 
prohibition but also whether the Ninth Circuit’s expansion will successfully 
prevent discriminatory peremptory strikes.  As Justice Marshall predicted, 
despite several limitations on the exercise of peremptory challenges, the 
jury selection process continues to evince many kinds of discrimination.21  
Still, in the face of more than thirty years of persistent criticism, the 
peremptory strike has persevered. 
 9. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 10. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 11. See infra Part I.C. 
 12. See infra Part I.C.1–2. 
 13. See infra Part I.C.1–2. 
 14. 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 15. Id. at 474. 
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 475. 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. 
 20. See id. 
 21. See generally J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994) (permitting 
peremptory strikes on the basis of classifications entitled to rational basis review). 
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The reason for this perseverance is that, despite the costs of permitting 
the procedure, prohibiting the exercise of peremptory challenges entirely 
also has costs.22  This Note examines the costs and the value of the 
peremptory challenge, and discusses whether Batson should be extended to 
prohibit sexual orientation–based strikes.  To this end, Part I discusses the 
merits and shortcomings of peremptory challenges, and explains the ways 
in which Batson and subsequent cases limit the exercise of peremptory 
strikes.  Part II discusses the two interpretations of Batson’s scope 
employed by the federal circuit courts.  The first prohibits and the second 
permits sexual orientation–based peremptory strikes.  Part III critically 
assesses the Batson regime and suggests that, to reduce the costs of further 
regulation of peremptory strikes, the Batson framework be altered to limit 
the circumstances under which a Batson challenge may be raised. 
I.   UNDERSTANDING THE BATSON REGIME AND ITS REGULATION OF 
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 
The Supreme Court once defined a peremptory strike of a venireman23 as 
a challenge “exercised without a reason stated, without inquiry and without 
being subject to the court’s control.”24  In 1986, however, the Court decided 
Batson.  This seminal case used the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause25 to empower courts to limit the motives with which a 
party may exercise peremptory strikes.26  Part I.A discusses the virtues and 
deficiencies of limiting peremptory challenges.  Part I.B traces the 
evolution of Supreme Court doctrine governing the exercise of peremptory 
strikes.  Part I.C explores how the Fourteenth Amendment’s three-tiered 
system of judicial review limits the scope of Batson’s protections. 
A.   Peremptory Challenges:  Their Merits and Shortcomings 
During voir dire27 proceedings, litigants have the opportunity to question 
prospective jurors to gain information that enables them to remove jurors 
from the venire.28  There are two procedures that facilitate this removal:  
for-cause and peremptory challenges.  A party may remove a prospective 
juror from the venire either by arguing to excuse a venireman peremptorily 
 22. See infra Part I.A.1. 
 23. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1789 (10th ed. 2014) (“A prospective juror; a member of 
a jury panel.”). 
 24. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). 
 25. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall . . . deny to any person within its 
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
 26. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 27. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1805 (10th ed. 2014) (defining “voir dire” as the 
preliminary examination of prospective jurors by a judge or lawyer to decide whether “the 
prospect is qualified and suitable to serve on a jury” that is informally referred to as “the 
jury-selection phase of a trial”). 
 28. See id. at 1789 (“A ‘venire’ is a panel of persons selected for jury duty and from 
among whom the jurors are to be chosen.”). 
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or for-cause.29  So long as it offers a “narrowly specified, provable and 
legally cognizable basis of partiality” for a strike, a litigant may exercise an 
unlimited number of for-cause challenges.30  Common bases of for-cause 
strikes include a prospective juror’s “familial or social relationship to one of 
the parties, failure to meet statutory qualifications for jury duty, or other 
specific evidence of bias.”31 
A peremptory strike, on the other hand, need not be “supported by a 
reason.”32  Rather, a peremptory challenge, theoretically, allows a party to 
exclude a member of the venire without justifying the strike to the court.33  
In recent decades, however, the Supreme Court has defined certain 
circumstances in which a party must divulge its reason for peremptorily 
striking a venireman.34  As the application of Batson has been expanded to 
limit the exercise of peremptory challenges, so too has the litany of 
arguments in favor of, and against, preserving the practice.35 
To grasp the split among federal courts of appeals, it is important to 
understand the virtues and shortcomings of peremptory challenges. 
1.   Arguments in Favor of Maintaining Peremptory Challenges 
The perseverance of peremptory challenges throughout history is often 
cited as a justification for their continued use.36  While peremptory 
challenges have been part of almost every system of jury trial, “from the 
Romans to today,” American colonists adopted the peremptory challenge 
from the eighteenth-century English legal system.37  Under that regime, the 
prosecutor was afforded unlimited exercise of peremptory strikes, whereas 
criminal defendants were allotted only thirty-five.38  While the use of such 
challenges was considered a “right” in American Colonies,39 the practice 
 29. Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire:  Preserving “Its Wonderful Power,” 27 STAN. L. 
REV. 545, 549–50 (1975). 
 30. Coburn R. Beck, The Current State of the Peremptory Challenge, 39 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 961, 963 (1998). 
 31. Id. at 964. 
 32. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 279 (10th ed. 2014). 
 33. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). 
 34. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 144–45 (1994) (explaining 
that, as with “race-based Batson claims,” counsel must articulate its basis for a peremptory 
challenge only if a prima facie case of intentional discrimination is established); Batson v. 
Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (holding that if a party establishes a prima facie case that 
opposing counsel has exercised a peremptory strike based on juror’s race, opposing counsel 
may refute the accusation by a articulating non-discriminatory reason for the strike). 
 35. See infra Part I.A.1–2. 
 36. See Elaine A. Carlson, Batson, J.E.B., and Beyond:  The Paradoxical Quest for 
Reasoned Peremptory Strikes in the Jury Selection Process, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 947, 953 
(1994). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id.; see also Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 214–17 (1965) (discussing the origins 
of the peremptory challenge in United States). 
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was not adopted by the U.S. Constitution.40  Nonetheless, the exercise of 
peremptory strikes is incorporated into both federal and state statutes, and 
their use continues uninterrupted in the United States.41  The historical 
persistence of peremptory strikes “demonstrate[s] the long and widely held 
belief that peremptory challenge is a necessary part of trial by jury.”42 
In addition to this history, the use of peremptory challenges is justified as 
a method by which a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an 
impartial jury43 is safeguarded.44  Since no objective basis to peremptorily 
strike a juror must be offered, parties may remove a prospective juror based 
simply on a negative intuition, “not necessarily capable of clear 
articulation,” that a juror maintains a certain bias.45  In other words, 
peremptory challenges ensure that a partial venireman will not remain on 
the jury simply because an attorney is unable to prove his or her bias.46 
Moreover, peremptory challenges allow litigants, “those whose fortunes 
are at issue,” to choose their own jury.47  Consider that, without having to 
meet any sort of legal standard, a litigant may dismiss any person he or she 
dislikes from the venire.  This gives the litigants, and through them, the 
public, confidence that “the jury is a good and proper mode for deciding 
matters and that its decision should be followed.”48  It is important not only 
that the jury be fair and impartial, but also that to the litigants, it seems to 
be so.49  “As Justice Frankfurter once wrote:  ‘The appearance of 
impartiality is an essential manifestation of its reality.’”50 
Peremptory strikes also protect jurors and promote the efficiency and 
integrity of the voir dire proceedings.51  During voir dire, lawyers and 
judges ask prospective jurors about their “private attitudes and practices—
 40. Stilson v. United States, 250 U.S. 583, 586 (1919) (“There is nothing in the 
Constitution of the United States which requires the Congress to grant peremptory 
challenges to defendants in criminal cases; trial by an impartial jury is all that is secured.”). 
 41. Carlson, supra note 36, at 953, 949. 
 42. Swain, 380 U.S. at 219. 
 43. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the 
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State . . . .”). 
 44. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 147 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“The principal value of the peremptory is that it helps produce fair and impartial juries.”); 
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 91 (1986) (stating that the use of peremptory strikes is 
“one means of assuring the selection of a qualified and unbiased jury”). 
 45. Carlson, supra note 36, at 954. 
Insuring a party’s right to a fair trial has been the historical justification for a 
system that allows the unchallenged exercise of peremptory strikes. Allowing 
counsel to strike prospective jurors without enunciating a reason is a recognition of 
the many biases and prejudices that all humans foster, and of the potential for a 
prospective juror’s failure to perceive that bias. It would be fruitless to inquire of 
unknown prejudices that a juror might harbor. 
Id. at 953–54. 
 46. See id. 
 47. Babcock, supra note 29, at 552. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. (quoting Dennis v. United States, 339 U.S. 162, 182 (1950)). 
 51. Albert W. Alschuler, The Supreme Court and the Jury:  Voir Dire Peremptory 
Challenges, and the Review of Jury Verdicts, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 153, 158 (1989). 
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asking, for example, about the jurors’ religious beliefs, drinking habits, 
jobs, hobbies, and prior experience with lawyers, then asking about their 
relatives’ jobs, experiences as crime victims, and arrest records as well.”52  
Consider that, because of the option to exercise a peremptory challenge, a 
potential juror may be relieved of the further extensive inquiry regarding 
her biases and prejudices that would be necessary to establish basis for a 
for-cause challenge.53  Should those questions be asked, the sensitive and 
embarrassing nature of the inquiry may cause an otherwise impartial juror 
to develop ill feelings toward, or a bias against, an attorney and his client.54 
Along the same lines, peremptory challenges allow attorneys to silently 
rely on “[c]ommon human experience, common sense, psychosociological 
studies, and public opinion polls” to inform their decisions.55  Such reliance 
is important because judges conduct voir dire examinations in many courts, 
or at the very least restrict the number and types of questions counsel may 
ask.56  While certainly promoting expediency, such procedures leave 
attorneys with limited information to support an argument for-cause.57  
Moreover, peremptory challenges render unnecessary certain group-bias 
arguments, like “middle-aged civil servants would be unable to decide on 
the evidence.”58  Such arguments are not only “societally divisive”59 but 
also more likely than not to be rejected, regardless of their accuracy.60  In 
fact, for-cause challenges are regularly rejected, “even when common sense 
indicates that there must be a bias—as long as the potential juror says that 
she would decide the case ‘only on the evidence presented,’ and would not 
be influenced by any other factor.”61 
Despite these virtues, the peremptory strike is heavily criticized,62 and so 
arguments in favor of eliminating or limiting the exercise of peremptory 
challenges must be addressed. 
2.   Arguments in Favor of Eliminating Peremptory Challenges 
Critics of the peremptory strike argue that the procedure may actually 
inhibit a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury.  
 52. Id. 
 53. Babcock, supra note 29, at 554–55. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 553. 
 56. Id. at 548. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 553. 
 59. Id. at 553–54  (“[T]o allow this knowledge to be expressed in the evaluative terms 
necessary for challenges for cause would undercut our desire for a society in which all 
people are judged as individuals and in which each is held reasonable and open to 
compromise . . . .  Although experience reveals that black males as a class can be biased 
against young alienated blacks who have not tried to join the middle class, to enunciate this 
in the concrete expression required of a challenge for cause is societally divisive.  Instead we 
have evolved in the peremptory challenge a system that allows the covert expression of what 
we dare not say but know is true more often tha[n] not.”). 
 60. Id. at 549–50. 
 61. Id. 
 62. See infra Part I.A.2. 
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They posit that parties do not exercise peremptory strikes in order to ensure 
an impartial jury at all.63  Instead, each selects jurors who will be partial or 
amenable to their position.64  Furthermore, the Supreme Court, in Batson, 
rejected the argument that since both parties have the ability to select jurors 
that are partial to their side, the juror’s biases will cancel each other out.65 
As such, critics argue that eliminating or reducing the number of 
peremptory challenges would result in a more efficient and cost-effective 
jury selection process.66  Without peremptory strikes, they argue, fewer 
veniremen would be excluded from the jury, thus, expediting the voir dire 
process and resulting in fewer citizens being called for jury duty.67  
Moreover, litigants would save money and time spent consulting so-called 
jury experts who specialize in determining which jurors will be favorable to 
their side.68  Should peremptory challenges be eliminated, trial courts 
would also save time by avoiding Batson hearings69 to determine if a party 
silently employed a permissible motive when peremptorily excusing a 
juror.70 
The use of peremptory challenges to select a jury, either partial or 
impartial, also appears to necessitate prejudgment of individuals, a practice 
that is seemingly inconsistent with “democratic ideals such as equality and 
fairness.”71  By its nature, a peremptory strike is discriminatory and 
“reflects a preconceived notion or negative intuition as to how a prospective 
juror will evaluate one’s client and case.”72 
Peremptory challenges may also compromise the cross-sectional ideal73 
by allowing a jury to be composed of quite like-minded individuals.74  Such 
 63. Babcock, supra note 29, at 551. 
 64. Id.  “Of course, neither litigant is trying to choose ‘impartial’ jurors, but rather to 
eliminate those who are sympathetic to the other side, hopefully leaving only those biased 
for him.” Id. 
 65. See Alschuler, supra note 51, at 205 (“The Batson decision . . . rejected the 
proposition that two wrongs make a right.”).  The ability of the defense counsel in Batson to 
peremptorily challenge whites did not justify the prosecutor’s challenge of blacks. Id. 
 66. PATRICIA HENLEY, PUBLIC LAW RESEARCH INSTITUTE, IMPROVING THE JURY SYSTEM:  
PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES 1, http://gov.uchastings.edu/public-law/docs/plri/juryper.pdf (last 
visited Feb. 23, 2015). 
 67. Id. at 3–4. 
 68. Id. at 4 (indicating that studies show that efforts to predict how a juror will decide a 
case, based on stereotypes, are rarely successful). 
 69. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 70. See Henley, supra note 66, at 3. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Carlson, supra note 36, at 953. 
 73. Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 538 (1975) (explaining that the cross-sectional 
ideal represents the idea that the group from which a jury is selected “must not 
systematically exclude distinctive groups in the community and thereby fail to be reasonably 
representative thereof”); see also Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940) (“It is part of the 
established tradition in the use of juries as instruments of public justice that the jury be a 
body truly representative of the community.”).  “The cross-sectional ideal is based on the 
idea that there is no way to escape from bias.” Henley, supra note 66, at 4.  “The only way to 
deal with prejudice is to have a balance of various values and perspectives on the jury.” Id. 
 74. Henley, supra note 66, at 4. 
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a composition potentially undermines the validity of jury verdicts.75  
Consider that when a group is systematically excluded from the jury it is 
potentially less likely that the verdict will “reflect the values of the 
community as a whole.”76 
Furthermore, a diverse jury arguably increases the probability that 
individuals with different backgrounds and opinions may be able to correct 
“mistaken views or recollections of evidence presented at trial.”77  Said 
differently, peremptory challenges that are used to eliminate jurors based on 
certain characteristics may increase the probability that prejudices will go 
unchallenged during deliberation.78  If peremptory strikes are eliminated, a 
resulting jury could be more representative of the community and, as a 
result, render a more widely accepted verdict.79 
As arguments for further expanding Batson persist, these merits and 
shortcomings of peremptory strikes must be considered.  For those who 
believe that the peremptory strike has little power to protect a criminal 
defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, Batson’s 
expansion has few, if any, costs.  The opposite is true, however, if the 
peremptory challenge is considered a safeguard of impartiality. 
B.   The Evolution of the Batson Challenge:  
How the Fourteenth Amendment Limits 
the Once Unrestricted Exercise of Peremptory Strikes 
Prior to Batson, the exercise of peremptory challenges, although finite in 
number, was unrestrained.80  Since that case was decided, however, a 
number of restrictions have been placed on the exercise of peremptory 
strikes.  Part I.B.1 introduces the pre-1986 peremptory challenge regime 
and the cases leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision in Batson.  Part 
I.B.2 discusses Batson and the Supreme Court’s shift in focus to the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Part I.B.3 considers the cases that have expanded 
Batson’s application, and Part I.B.4 examines the effect these cases have 
had on the Batson inquiry. 
1.   Pre-Batson Decisions 
In 1879, the Supreme Court decided Strauder v. West Virginia,81 and 
first addressed whether criminal defendants had a right to a trial by a jury 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id.  The cross-sectional ideal is considered a means by which to achieve an impartial 
jury. People v. Wheeler, 583 P.2d 748, 754–56 (Cal. 1978).  The best means of achieving an 
impartial jury is to promote a jury composed of various types of people with different views, 
whose respective biases, “to the extent they are antagonistic, will tend to cancel each other 
out.” Id. at 755. 
 78. Henley, supra note 66, at 4. 
 79. Id. at 5. 
 80. See Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). 
 81. 100 U.S. 303 (1879). 
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“impanelled without discrimination . . . because of race or color.”82  The 
case evaluated the constitutionality of a West Virginia statute that restricted 
eligibility to participate on a jury, stating, “All white male persons who are 
twenty-one years of age and who are citizens of this State shall be liable to 
serve as jurors, except as herein provided.”83  The Court reasoned that 
systematically denying blacks the right to participate “in the administration 
of the law, as jurors,” based solely on their race, was an “impediment to 
securing to individuals of the race that equal justice which the law aims to 
secure to all others.”84 
While Strauder prevented states from statutorily denying black males the 
right to be called for jury service, it did not prevent them from being 
peremptorily dismissed based on their race.85  In other words, the case 
simply ensured black men the right to be part of the venire, not the right to 
be chosen to sit on the jury.86  Under Strauder, therefore, it was possible 
that upon completion of voir dire proceedings, the resulting jury would be 
entirely homogenous.87 
Subsequent cases similarly expounded this foundation, determining that 
while a black defendant was not entitled to a jury comprised of members of 
his own race,88 the Equal Protection Clause was violated when a state 
deliberately excluded citizens from participating in “the administration of 
justice” based on race.89  The Court recognized that “[j]urymen should be 
selected as individuals, on the basis of individual qualifications, and not as 
members of a race.”90  Furthermore, it concluded that excluding citizens, 
African American or otherwise,91 from jury service based on race, not only 
violated the Equal Protection Clause but was also “at war with our basic 
concepts of a democratic society and a representative government.”92 
 82. Id. at 305. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Id. at 308 (“If in those States where the colored people constitute a majority of the 
entire population a law should be enacted excluding all white men from jury service, thus 
denying to them the privilege of participating equally with the blacks in the administration of 
justice, we apprehend no one would be heard to claim that it would not be a denial to white 
men of the equal protection of the laws.  Nor if a law should be passed excluding all 
naturalized Celtic Irishmen, would there be any doubt of its inconsistency with the spirit of 
the amendment.”). 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Carlson, supra note 36, at 955. 
 88. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 305. 
 89. See generally Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Ex parte Virginia, 100 
U.S. 339 (1879). See also Carter v. Texas, 177 U.S. 442, 447 (1900) (“Whenever by any 
action of a state, whether through its legislature, through its courts, or through its executive 
or administrative officers, all persons of the African race are excluded, solely because of 
their race or color, from serving as grand jurors in the criminal prosecution of a person of the 
African race, the equal protection of the laws is denied.”). 
 90. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282, 286 (1950). 
 91. Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 482 (1954) (holding that the constitutional 
prohibition of intentional exclusion from a jury is not limited to African Americans but also 
applies to all other ethnic groups). 
 92. Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128, 130 (1940). 
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While these cases prohibited the exclusion of citizens from jury service 
based on race, it was not until its 1965 decision in Swain v. Alabama,93 that 
the Supreme Court considered whether a prosecutor’s racially 
discriminatory exercise of peremptory challenges violated the Fourteenth 
Amendment.94  In this case, the defendant moved to void the petit jury95 
that convicted him of rape based on “alleged invidious discrimination in the 
selection of jurors.”96  Supporting the defendant’s contention was evidence 
that, of the eight black jurors on the petit venire, two were exempt and the 
other six peremptorily dismissed by the prosecutor.97  Moreover, the record 
indicated that while blacks were often called to sit on the venire, no black 
citizen had actually served on a Talladega jury since 1950.98 
Evaluating the evidence with the presumption that a prosecutor uses 
peremptory challenges “to obtain a fair and impartial jury,”99 the Court 
determined that the evidence in this case fell short of proving “the 
prosecutor . . . in case after case, whatever the circumstances, . . . [was] 
responsible for the removal of [African Americans] who [had] been selected 
as qualified jurors.”100  While the defendant demonstrated that in his own 
case the prosecutor exercised peremptory strikes to exclude blacks from the 
jury, the record did not evince how the prosecutor had used the challenges 
in the past.101  The Court reasoned that the record was “absolutely silent” as 
to which past instances of exclusion were facilitated by the prosecutor 
alone.102  Apparently, in some cases, the prosecution agreed with 
defendants to remove blacks from the jury.103  Absent such a showing, the 
Court deemed the evidence insufficient to establish, prima facie, that the 
state applied peremptory challenges in order to systematically exclude 
jurors based on race.104 
Quite consistent with the Supreme Court’s pre-Batson focus on the 
integrity of the peremptory challenge regime,105 this case provided an 
“illusory hope . . . [of] racial parity.”106  The possibility of meaningfully 
challenging a racially discriminatory peremptory strike was essentially 
negated by the absence of state records detailing prosecutors’ use of 
 93. 380 U.S. 202 (1965). 
 94. Id. at 209. 
 95. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 987 (10th ed. 2014) (“A jury, (usually consisting of 6 
or twelve persons) summoned and empaneled in the trial of a specific case.”). 
 96. Swain, 380 U.S. at 203. 
 97. Id. at 205. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. at 222. 
 100. Id. at 234, 223. 
 101. Id. at 224. 
 102. Id. 224–25. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. at 226–27 (explaining that without a detailed record the state could not 
effectively rebut allegations of discrimination). 
 105. See id. at 222 (noting that “[a]ny other result . . . would establish a rule wholly at 
odds with peremptory challenge system”). 
 106. Carlson, supra note 36, at 956; see Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 92 (1986) 
(“[Swain v. Alabama] placed on defendants a crippling burden of proof.”). 
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peremptory strikes.107  This difficulty remained until the Court decided 
Batson in 1986.108 
2.   Batson v. Kentucky:  A Shift in the Supreme Court’s Focus 
Prior to its decision in Batson, and as early as Strauder, the Supreme 
Court seemed to prioritize a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to 
an impartial jury over a juror’s Fourteenth Amendment protection against 
discrimination.109  The Court’s landmark 1986 decision in Batson marked a 
shift in the Court’s focus and demonstrated a greater concern for protecting 
jurors from discrimination.110 
In Batson, the Supreme Court reconsidered the evidentiary burden Swain 
placed on criminal defendants, claiming the prosecutor’s use of peremptory 
strikes denied them equal protection.111  In this case, the petitioner, a black 
man convicted of second-degree burglary and receipt of stolen goods, 
challenged the prosecutor’s peremptory removal of the only four black 
jurors on the venire.112  Overruling Swain,113 the Court held that “a 
defendant may establish a prima facie case of purposeful discrimination in 
selection of the petit jury solely on evidence concerning the prosecutor’s 
exercise of peremptory challenges at the defendant’s [own] trial.”114  The 
decision emphasized that peremptorily excusing a prospective juror based 
on his or her race was injurious to the defendant and the excluded juror, but 
also to the public, as it undermined its confidence in the justice system.115 
 107. Carlson, supra note 36, at 956 (“[Swain’s] standard negated any effective challenge 
to the use of racially motivated peremptory strikes because few states even kept records of 
how peremptory challenges were used by prosecutors.”). 
 108. See generally Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (reconsidering the evidentiary burden on criminal 
defendants). 
 109. See, e.g., Swain, 380 U.S. at 222 (recognizing that racially discriminatory exercise of 
peremptory challenges was against the Fourteenth Amendment, but imposing a nearly 
insurmountable burden of proving a prima facie case in order to preserve the purpose of 
peremptory challenges); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 305 (1879) (framing the 
issue in terms of a criminal defendant’s right to an impartial jury “impanelled without 
discrimination” and not in terms of a juror’s right not to be discriminated against). 
 110. See generally Batson, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
 111. Id. at 82.  The jury occupies a central position in the justice system, “safeguarding a 
person accused of crime against the arbitrary exercise of power by prosecutor or judge.” Id. 
at 86.  A discriminatorily chosen jury, therefore, would violate a defendant’s right under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to “protection of life and liberty against race or color prejudice.” Id. 
at 87 (quoting Strauder, 100 U.S. at 309). 
 112. Id. at 82–83. 
 113. See Jeffrey Bellin & Junichi P. Semitsu, Widening Batson’s Net to Ensnare More 
Than the Unapologetically Bigoted or Painfully Unimaginative Attorney, 96 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1075, 1086 n.48 (2011) (explaining that the Batson opinion framed its holding as a 
modification and not a repudiation of Swain, even though the majority reached “precisely the 
opposite conclusion as Swain”); see also Batson, 476 U.S. at 100 n.25 (“To the extent 
anything in [Swain] is contrary to the principles we articulate today, that decision is 
overruled.”); id. at 100 (White, J., concurring) (“The Court overturns the principal holding in 
Swain.”). 
 114. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96 (majority opinion). 
 115. See id. at 87 (“The harm from discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that 
inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to touch the entire community. Selection 
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The real challenge the Court faced was not articulating the constitutional 
prohibition against race-based peremptory strikes.116  Rather it was the 
“daunting task of fashioning a mechanism to enforce that prohibition” that 
presented the biggest challenge.117  The Court crafted a three-step 
procedure when a party challenges an opponent’s peremptory strike as one 
based on racial discrimination.118  These three steps have evolved over 
time. 
Batson’s first step required a defendant to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination.119  To do so, the defendant needed to establish that he was 
part of a cognizable racial group120 and that the prosecutor exercised 
peremptory challenges to remove venireman of defendant’s race from the 
jury.121  Then, the defendant also was required to show that the 
circumstances of the challenged peremptory strikes raised an inference that 
the prosecutor excluded venireman based on their race.122  To determine 
whether this preliminary inference of purposeful discrimination existed, the 
trial court was instructed to “consider all relevant circumstances.”123 
If the defendant successfully established a prima facie case, the burden 
would shift to the state to provide a neutral explanation for having 
challenged the black jurors.124  The state did not have to justify the exercise 
of a for-cause challenge.125  Rather, the prosecutor only had to furnish an 
explanation that did not violate Equal Protection guarantees.126  Namely, 
the prosecutor could not justify the peremptory challenge on the assumption 
or intuition that the jurors would not be impartial because they were of the 
same race as the defendant.127  Should the prosecutor fail to furnish a race-
procedures that purposefully exclude black persons from juries undermine public confidence 
in the fairness of our system of justice.”). 
 116. Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 113, at 1086.  The Court reiterated the repeatedly 
articulated principle that “the Equal Protection Clause forbids the prosecutor to challenge 
potential jurors solely on account of their race or on the assumption that black jurors as a 
group will be unable impartially to consider the State’s case against a black defendant.” Id. 
(quoting Batson, 476 U.S. at 89). 
 117. Id.  Creating this mechanism was particularly difficult because the Court rejected 
Justice Marshall’s “relatively clean” suggestion of abolishing the peremptory challenge all 
together. Id. at 1086–87. 
 118. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96–98. 
 119. Id. at 96. 
 120. Id. (citing Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482, 494 (1977)). 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 97. 
 123. Id. at 96.  The Court listed two examples of evidence that tends to prove purposeful 
discrimination. Id. at 97.  First, a pattern of strikes against black jurors may give rise to a 
preliminary inference of discrimination. Id.  Moreover, the prosecutor’s “questions and 
statements during voir dire examination and in exercising his challenges may support or 
refute an inference of discriminatory purpose.” Id.  But ultimately, the Court demonstrated 
confidence that trial judges were experienced enough to decide whether the circumstances of 
a particular case established prima facie case of discrimination against a black veniremen. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. 
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neutral explanation for its peremptory challenge, the defendant’s conviction 
would be reversed.128 
Kentucky objected to the Court’s framework, positing that it would 
“eviscerate the fair trial values served by the peremptory challenge.”129  
The Court pointed out, however, that, while it is an important trial 
procedure, the right to peremptory challenges is not one guaranteed by the 
Constitution.130  The Court further characterized its opinion as one that 
“enforce[d] the mandate of equal protection and further[ed] the ends of 
justice.”131 
Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion, agreed that the majority 
“cogently explain[ed] the pernicious nature of the racially discriminatory 
use of peremptory challenges.”132  He did not, however, have as much faith 
in its designed solution, stating:  “The decision today will not end the racial 
discrimination that peremptories inject into the jury-selection process.  That 
goal can be accomplished only by eliminating peremptory challenges 
entirely.”133 
Despite Justice Marshall’s misgivings, the Court has relied on Batson to 
craft its later limitations on peremptory strikes.134  In its expansion of 
Batson, the Court has also significantly altered the framework designed in 
the 1986 decision.135 
3.   The Supreme Court’s Expansion of Batson Beyond Its Original Purpose 
Since Batson was decided in 1986, the Court has imposed more 
expansive limitations on the exercise of peremptory challenges.136  
Batson’s holding was originally limited to the discriminatory peremptory 
challenges exercised by prosecutors in criminal cases where the juror was 
the same race as the defendant.137  Since its decision in Batson, the 
Supreme Court has extended its rationale far beyond those original 
bounds.138 
Powers v. Ohio139 was the first case to broaden the application of 
Batson’s rule.  There the Court held that a race-based exclusion of a juror is 
prohibited, even when the potential juror and the defendant are not of a 
 128. Id. at 100. 
 129. Id. at 98. 
 130. Id. at 98–99. 
 131. Id. at 99. 
 132. Id. at 102 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
 133. Id. at 102–03. 
 134. See, e.g., J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
 135. See infra Part I.B.4. 
 136. See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 127; Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
 137. David Smith & Rachel Dennehy, Controversy over the Peremptory Challenge:  
Should Batson Be Expanded?, 10 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 453, 461 (1995). 
 138. See, e.g., J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 142–43 (extending Batson to prohibit gender-based 
peremptory strikes); Powers, 499 U.S. at 415 (extending Batson’s application to cases where 
defendant and stricken juror were not of the same race). 
 139. 499 U.S. 400 (1991). 
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common race.140  The petitioner was a white defendant objecting to the 
exclusion of black veniremen.141  While the state argued that the petitioner 
was precluded from objecting to the peremptory dismissals under Batson, 
because he was not of the same race as the excluded jurors, the Court 
ultimately disagreed.  Essentially, criminal defendants were afforded “third-
party standing”142 to challenge a violation of a juror’s equal protection 
rights.143 
The Supreme Court further broadened Batson’s application in the years 
following Powers.144  Until 1991, the Supreme Court had only considered 
whether the discriminatory peremptory strikes of a prosecutor, a recognized 
state actor, violated the Equal Protection Clause.145  In Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete Co.,146 by contrast, the Court considered whether 
litigants in civil cases could exercise discriminatory peremptory 
challenges.147  First, the Court concluded that the selection of jurors serves 
an important function of the government and attorneys act with substantial 
assistance of the court.148  Furthermore, should civil veniremen be 
subjected to discrimination, “[t]he injury to excluded jurors would be the 
direct result of governmental delegation and participation.”149  Thus, during 
voir dire proceedings, the exercise of peremptory challenges is “pursuant to 
a course of state action.”150  The Court further reasoned that, regardless of 
whether a trial is criminal or civil, a challenged juror’s equal protection 
rights are violated when they are peremptorily dismissed based on race.151  
 140. Id. at 413 (stating that “a criminal defendant suffers real injury when the prosecutor 
excludes jurors . . . on account of race”). 
 141. Id. at 406. 
 142. See id. at 410. The Court engaged in a three-part analysis to determine whether a 
criminal defendant could be afforded third-party standing on behalf of a juror. See id. at 
410–11.  It found that voir dire proceedings permit a party to establish a very close 
relationship, “if not a bond of trust,” with the veniremen. Id. at 413.  It also found that this 
relationship is maintained throughout the trial and, in some cases, through sentencing. Id.  
Furthermore, the congruent interest criminal defendants and jurors have in “eliminating 
racial discrimination from the courtroom,” according to the Court, makes it “necessary and 
appropriate” for the defendant to have third-party standing.  Id. at 413–14.  Lastly, the Court 
determined that, while improperly excluded jurors have a right to bring suit on their own 
behalf, these challenges would necessarily be rare. See id. at 414.  Coupled with the financial 
burden at trial and the likely small financial stake, jurors would rarely, if ever, bring such 
action. See id. 
 143. Id. at 416. 
 144. See Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42 (1992); Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete 
Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
 145. McCollum, 505 U.S. at 50 (“Until Edmonson, the cases decided by this Court that 
presented the problem of racially discriminatory peremptory challenges involved assertions 
of discrimination by a prosecutor . . . .”). 
 146. 500 U.S. 614 (1991). 
 147. Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 621–22 (considering (1) “the extent to which the actor relies 
on governmental assistance and benefits;” (2) “whether the actor is performing a traditional 
governmental function;” and (3) “whether the injury caused is aggravated in a unique way by 
the incidents of governmental authority”). 
 148. Id. at 628. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 622. 
 151. Id. at 628. 
 
2015] NARROWING AND EXPANDING BATSON 2013 
Accordingly, the Court held that civil litigants may not exercise racially 
motivated peremptory strikes.152 
In its 1992 decision in Georgia v. McCollum,153 relying heavily on its 
analysis in Edmonson, the Court considered whether criminal defendants 
were permitted to peremptorily strike jurors based on race.154  The Court 
predictably concluded that criminal defendants were state actors subject to 
the same limitations as prosecutors and civil litigants under the Equal 
Protection Clause.155  Accordingly, the Court further broadened Batson’s 
scope and reaffirmed its post-Swain commitment to protecting jurors from 
discrimination, stating, “‘if race stereotypes are the price for acceptance of a 
jury panel as fair,’ we reaffirm today that such a ‘price is too high to meet 
the standard of the Constitution.’”156 
The Court’s final expansion of Batson occurred in J.E.B. v. Alabama,157 
when it prohibited peremptory challenges based on gender.158  The 
respondent in J.E.B. used nine of her ten peremptory challenges to exclude 
men from the venire, resulting in an exclusively female jury.159  The 
petitioner challenged the use of these strikes as a violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause.160  Outlining the history of discrimination against 
women in the United States, the Court reasoned that “the Equal Protection 
Clause prohibits discrimination in jury selection on the basis of gender, or 
on the assumption that an individual will be biased in a particular case for 
no reason other than the fact that the person happens to be a woman or 
happens to be a man.”161  The Court further elaborated that similar to race 
the guarantee of the Equal Protection Clause, “ensuring citizens that their 
State will not discriminate,” would be meaningless if the Court were to 
permit gender-based peremptory exclusion.162 
4.   The Post-Expansion Batson Inquiry 
As its rationale has been extended, the Batson inquiry designed by the 
Supreme Court has been altered and more thoroughly defined.  Entirely 
eliminating the first requirement of the prima facie case defined in 
 152. Id. 
 153. 505 U.S. 42 (1992).  The Court considered four questions: 
First, whether a criminal defendant’s exercise of peremptory challenges in a 
racially discriminatory manner inflicts the harms addressed by Batson.  Second, 
whether the exercise of peremptory challenges by a criminal defendant constitutes 
state action.  Third, whether prosecutors have standing to raise this constitutional 
challenge.  And fourth, whether the constitutional rights of a criminal defendant 
nonetheless preclude the extension of our precedents to this case. 
Id. at 48. 
 154. Id. at 44. 
 155. Id. at 59. 
 156. Id. at 57 (quoting Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614 (1991)). 
 157. 511 U.S. 127 (1994). 
 158. Id. at 146. 
 159. Id. at 129. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 146. 
 162. Id. (quoting Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97–98 (1986)). 
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Batson,163 trial courts today begin a Batson hearing by determining whether 
“the totality of the relevant facts” sufficiently establish a prima facie case of 
purposeful discrimination.164  “Indicia of a prima facie case might include 
the ‘pattern’ of strikes, counsel’s ‘questions and statements during voir 
dire,’ as well as ‘racial identity between the defendant and the excused 
prospective juror.’”165 
If a trial judge determines that a prima facie case of discrimination has 
been made, the burden of production shifts to the party who executed the 
strike to offer a race-neutral166 or gender-neutral167 explanation.  An 
explanation is not neutral if it is based on an assumption that members of a 
particular race or gender are likely to hold certain views or be biased in a 
certain way.168  Moreover, a “legitimate reason” for a peremptory challenge 
is not one that simply makes logical sense.169  Rather, it is one that does not 
deny equal protection guarantees.170  In fact, this second step is concerned 
only with the “facial validity” of a party’s explanation.171  Thus, any 
justification will be deemed neutral unless “a discriminatory intent is 
inherent in the prosecutor’s explanation.”172 
The third and final step of a Batson inquiry requires the trial court to 
evaluate the plausibility and “persuasiveness of the prosecutor’s 
justification for his peremptory strike.”173  The very point of a peremptory 
strike is that a party’s motivation for the challenge remains unspoken.174  
 163. See Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400, 415 (1991) (holding that defendant does not have 
to be of the same race as excluded juror in order to raise a Batson challenge). 
 164. Batson, 476 U.S. at 94; see Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 170 (2005) (“[A] 
defendant satisfies the requirements of Batson’s first step by producing evidence sufficient to 
permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination has occurred.”). 
 165. Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 113, at 1087 (quoting Powers, 499 U.S. at 416; 
Edmonsville v. Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 631 (1991)). 
 166. Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 767 (1995). 
 167. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 144–45 (1994) (requiring gender-
neutral explanation for peremptory challenge if prima facie case of intentional discrimination 
based on juror’s gender is established). 
 168. Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 (holding that a reason is not legitimate if it “arise[s] solely 
from the juror’s race”). 
 169. Purkett, 514 U.S. at 768–69. 
 170. Id. at 769. 
 171. Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 360 (1866). 
 172. Id.  Some examples of accepted neutral explanations include:   “[n]ot smart enough 
to serve on the jury,” “[d]ressed like a 15-year-old, with baggy clothes,” “[n]ot mature 
enough,” “single.”  Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 113, at 1091. 
Our survey reveals that in a broad array of cases . . . attorneys articulate and judges 
accept “race-neutral” explanations for peremptory strikes that either highly 
correlate with race or are silly, trivial, or irrelevant to the case.  Reviewing courts 
then affirm these determinations.  This is significant because if attorneys can avoid 
Batson in this manner, there are only two narrow circumstances in which a Batson 
challenge is likely to succeed:  (1) where an attorney admits to a racial motivation 
and (2) where an attorney’s explanation applies to a virtually identical juror of a 
different race who was not stricken. . . .  [T]hese two scenarios in which Batson 
will likely smoke out a racially discriminatory strike are exceedingly unlikely. 
Id. at 1102. 
 173. Id. at 1088 (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 338–39 (2003)). 
 174. Babcock, supra note 29, at 553–55. 
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Thus, most often there is little evidence for the trial court to rely on when 
deciding this issue other than “the demeanor of the attorney who exercises 
the challenge.”175  The trial court essentially makes a fact-based 
determination whether the prosecutor’s explanation is credible.176  The 
Supreme Court also has mandated that the trial court be afforded great 
deference of its third-step determination.177  This is practically justified by 
the “necessarily fact intensive” Batson review.178  Consider, many of the 
critical facts relied on by the trial court, such as the attorney’s demeanor, 
will not be readily apparent on the appellate record.179 
C.   Drawing the Line:  The Fate of Peremptory Strikes in the Wake of 
Supreme Court Equal Protection Jurisprudence 
In J.E.B. v. Alabama, after expanding Batson a final time, the Supreme 
Court iterated that its holding did not “imply the elimination of all 
peremptory challenges.”180  It clearly explained that parties can exercise 
peremptory challenges to remove any “group or class of individuals 
normally subject to ‘rational basis’ review”181 under the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.  With this, the Court drew a line in 
the sand.  A Batson challenge cannot be sustained unless the juror stricken 
from the venire is a member of a class entitled to something more than 
“rational basis review.”182  Part I.C.1. defines rational basis review and 
discusses the Supreme Court’s three-tiered system of judicial review.  Part 
I.C.2. examines how the Court determines whether a classification is 
entitled to more than mere rational basis review. 
1.   The Three-Tiered System of Judicial Review 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment 
Ordinarily, a classification is constitutional if it passes rational basis 
review,183 the most lenient form of judicial review.184  A court will 
consider a law subject to rational basis review with a “presumption of 
constitutionality,” and uphold it if the challenged law is “rationally related” 
 175. Hernandez, 500 U.S. at 365. 
 176. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 98 n.21 (1986) (“[T]he trial judge’s findings in the 
context under consideration here largely will turn on evaluation of credibility . . . .” (quoting 
Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575–76 (1985))).  The credibility determination 
considers, among other things, the party’s demeanor, the reasonableness or improbability of 
the offered explanation, and whether the explanation has “some basis in accepted trial 
strategy.” Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 113, at 1088 (quoting Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 339). 
 177. Bellin & Semitsu, supra note 113, at 1089. 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. 
 180. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994). 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id.; see also SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 479–80 (9th 
Cir. 2014). 
 183. Roberta A. Kaplan & Julie E. Fink, The Defense of Marriage Act:  The Application 
of Heightened Scrutiny to Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation, 2012 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 203, 205–06. 
 184. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996). 
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to a “legitimate government interest.”185  This standard of review is applied 
in all cases where no fundamental right or suspect classification is at 
issue.186  For example, laws that discriminate on the basis of mental 
disability or age are reviewed under this lenient standard.187 
Some legislative classifications are subject to “a more exacting type of 
heightened scrutiny,” if they burden a quasi-suspect188 or suspect189 class: 
Such classifications are appropriately treated by the courts with extreme 
skepticism, because there is a particularly high risk that the law was 
designed for an improper purpose.  In other words, the assumption in 
those situations is that the legislature should not be in the business of 
passing laws that treat these groups differently than others.190 
Intermediate scrutiny, at issue in J.E.B., is the middle tier of judicial 
review applied in cases involving quasi-suspect classifications.191  In order 
for a classification to be sustained under intermediate scrutiny, the law must 
further an important government interest by means that are substantially 
related to that interest.192 
The most rigorous strict scrutiny standard is applied in cases involving 
suspect classifications such as race.193  To pass strict scrutiny, the 
legislature must have passed the law to further a “compelling governmental 
interest,” and must have narrowly crafted the rule to achieve that goal.194  A 
court applies strict scrutiny if the government significantly abridges a 
fundamental right with the law’s enactment or passes a law that involves a 
suspect classification.195  Suspect classifications include race, national 
origin, and alienage.196 
Under the heightened scrutiny standards, “a tenable justification must 
describe actual stated purposes, not rationalizations for actions in fact 
differently grounded.”197  Stated differently, a state actor cannot defend a 
classification based on the “hypothetical justifications” welcomed under 
rational basis review.198  Accordingly, in most equal protection analyses, 
the “primary, and often determinative, question” concerns the level of 
scrutiny to be applied and whether the classification involved should be 
treated as suspect or non-suspect.199 
 185. Kaplan & Fink, supra note 183, at 205. 
 186. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631. 
 187. See Kaplan & Fink, supra note 183, at 205. 
 188. Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 313 (D. Conn. 2012) 
(recognizing that gender and illegitimate children are quasi-suspect classes). 
 189. Id. (identifying race, national ancestry, and ethnic origin as suspect classes). 
 190. Kaplan & Fink, supra note 183, at 205. 
 191. See Pedersen, 881 F. Supp. 2d at 310. 
 192. See id. 
 193. See id. at 298, 313. 
 194. Id. at 310. 
 195. See id. 
 196. Id. at 313. 
 197. United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 535–36 (1996). 
 198. Kaplan & Fink, supra note 183, at 206. 
 199. Id. 
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2.   Defining Suspect and Quasi-Suspect Classifications 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the Supreme Court developed a test for 
determining whether a particular group is entitled to the application of 
heightened scrutiny.200  This test contemplates four factors.201  First, it 
considers whether the group in question has suffered a history of 
discrimination.202  Second, it inquires as to whether the group-defining 
characteristic has any relation to an individual’s ability to perform or 
contribute to society.203  Third, it considers whether the group exhibits 
“obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a 
discrete group.”204  Last, the test accounts for whether the group is a 
numerical minority or politically powerless.205 
When applying this test, there is no single factor that is dispositive.206  
Any one of the four factors may signal to the court that a classification, 
“provides no sensible ground for differential treatment”207 or is “more 
likely than others to reflect deep-seated prejudice rather than legislative 
rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective.”208  The Court has given 
particular consideration to whether a group has been subjected to a history 
of discrimination, as well as whether the distinguishable characteristics of a 
group bear any relation to its ability to perform or contribute to society.209 
II.   THE CIRCUIT SPLIT:  DOES THE BATSON REGIME PROHIBIT OR PERMIT 
SEXUAL ORIENTATION–BASED PEREMPTORY CHALLENGES? 
When the Supreme Court decided J.E.B., it made very clear that the 
expansion of Batson’s reach was not intended to entirely abdicate the 
peremptory challenge’s effect.210  In order for this intention to be 
practicable, it was necessary to draw a line in the sand.  At the time, the 
Court decided that this line would be drawn based on the level of judicial 
review the Court would apply when reviewing different classifications 
under the Fourteenth Amendment.211  Therefore, whether a peremptory 
challenge based on sexual orientation is eligible for Batson protection 
depends entirely on the level of scrutiny a court applies on review.212 
 200. See id. 
 201. See John Nicodemo, Homosexuals, Equal Protection, and the Guarantee of 
Fundamental Rights in the New Decade:  An Optimist’s Quasi-Suspect View of Recent 
Events and Their Impact on Heightened Scrutiny for Sexual Orientation–Based 
Discrimination, 28 TOURO L. REV. 285, 292–97 (2012). 
 202. See id. at 292–93. 
 203. See Kaplan & Fink, supra note 183, at 206. 
 204. Id. 
 205. See Nicodemo, supra note 201, at 296–97. 
 206. See Kaplan & Fink, supra note 183, at 206. 
 207. Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 440 (1985). 
 208. Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 216 n.14 (1982). 
 209. Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976); Kaplan & Fink, supra 
note 183, at 206. 
 210. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994). 
 211. Id. 
 212. See id. 
 
2018 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
Part II of this Note discusses the federal circuit courts’ diverse treatment 
of classifications based on sexual orientation and the resulting circuit split 
regarding the eligibility of jurors to receive Batson protection against 
peremptory challenges motivated by sexual orientation.  Part II.A examines 
three Supreme Court cases reviewing the constitutionality of classifications 
based on sexual orientation.  Part II.B analyzes the position that heightened 
scrutiny is applied to classifications based on sexual orientation, and 
therefore, Batson may be extended to prohibit peremptory strikes based on 
sexual orientation.  In contrast, Part II.C dissects the opposite position that 
classifications based on sexual orientation are entitled only to rational basis 
review, and thus, peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation remain 
permissible. 
A.   The Supreme Court’s Review of Classifications 
Based on Sexual Orientation Under the Fourteenth Amendment 
The Supreme Court has decided three cases concerning classifications 
based on sexual orientation which involved, at least in part, an analysis 
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause:  Romer v. 
Evans,213 Lawrence v. Texas,214 and Windsor v. United States.215  The 
current circuit split, regarding which level of scrutiny must be applied when 
reviewing classifications based on sexual orientation, largely is based on 
how these cases have been, and are being, interpreted.216 
1.   Romer v. Evans 
In its 1996 decision in Romer, the Supreme Court first addressed sexual 
orientation discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause.217  In this 
case, the Court reviewed the constitutionality of an amendment to the 
Colorado Constitution, which prohibited all legislative, executive, and 
judicial action designed to protect homosexuals.218  The Court specifically 
articulated its application of rational basis review219 and explained the 
 213. 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
 214. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 215. Windsor v. United States (Windsor III), 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013). 
 216. See, e.g., SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 480, 484 (9th 
Cir. 2014) (interpreting Windsor III to indicate homosexuals are entitled to heightened 
scrutiny).  But see, e.g., DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 414 (6th Cir. 2014) (interpreting 
Windsor III as a decision about federalism, not heightened scrutiny). 
 217. The Supreme Court previously reviewed sexual orientation discrimination under the 
Due Process Clause in Bowers v. Hardwick. See 478 U.S. 186 (1986).  In that case, 
respondent challenged the constitutionality of a Georgia statute criminalizing sodomy. See 
id. at 187–88.  The Court found that there was no fundamental right to engage in homosexual 
sodomy as such a right was not “‘implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,’ such that 
‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were sacrificed.’” Id. at 191–92 (quoting Palko 
v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937)). 
 218. Romer, 517 U.S. at 623.  This amendment was passed in response to several 
Colorado municipalities’ prohibition of sexual orientation discrimination in realms of public 
and private housing, employment, education, public accommodations, and health and 
welfare services. Id. 
 219. Id. at 631–32. 
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deferential test:  “In the ordinary case, a law will be sustained if it can be 
said to advance a legitimate government interest, even if the law seems 
unwise or works to the disadvantage of a particular group, or if the rationale 
for it seems tenuous.”220  The Court found that Amendment 2 
“confound[ed]” even this deferential standard for two reasons.221 
First, the Court explained, Amendment 2 denied “equal protection of the 
laws in the most literal sense.”222  It imposed a “broad and undifferentiated 
disability on a single named group”223 and was, simultaneously, “too 
narrow and too broad.”224  It was a type of legislation simply not supported 
by “our constitutional tradition,” making it more difficult for a specific 
group to obtain help from its government.225 
Second, the Court concluded that Colorado did not have a legitimate 
interest in enacting Amendment 2.226  The Court not only rejected the 
state’s proffered interests,227 but also determined that the harm Amendment 
2 inflicted on homosexuals “outr[an] and belie[d]” any legitimate interest 
that could justify its enactment.228  The Court, instead, succumbed to the 
“inevitable inference,” that the law was motivated by animus toward 
homosexuals,229 and concluded that Amendment 2 did not further a 
legitimate end but rather sought to make homosexuals unequal to everyone 
else.230  Notably, the Court did not address whether homosexuals 
constituted a quasi-suspect or suspect class.231 
2.   Lawrence v. Texas 
Seven years after Romer, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutional 
legitimacy of a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy in 
Lawrence.232  While it ultimately struck down the statute under the Due 
Process Clause, the Court superficially reviewed its legitimacy under the 
Equal Protection Clause.233  The majority concluded that, while Romer 
potentially provided a basis for striking down the statute under the Equal 
 220. Id. at 632. 
 221. Id. at 633. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 632. 
 224. Id. at 633. 
 225. Id. 
 226. See id. at 634–35. 
 227. See id. at 635 (noting that Colorado cited “respect for other citizens’ freedom of 
association,” “liberties of landlords or employers who have personal or religious objections 
to homosexuality,” and “conserving resources to fight discrimination against other groups” 
as its purposes for passing Amendment 2).  The Court discredited these explanations because 
“[t]he breadth of the amendment [was] so far removed from these particular justifications.” 
Id. 
 228. Id. 
 229. Id. at 634–35 (“[L]aws of the kind now before us raise the inevitable inference that 
the disadvantage imposed is born of animosity toward the class of persons affected.”). 
 230. Id. at 635. 
 231. See generally id. 
 232. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 233. See id. at 574–75. 
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Protection Clause, the case required the Court to evaluate the “continuing 
validity” of Bowers v. Hardwick.234 
In her concurring opinion, however, Justice O’Connor explicitly found 
the Texas statute unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.235  
She did so applying a “more searching form of rational basis review” that 
was justified by the statute’s “desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group.”236  Rearticulating the principles set forth in Romer, she stated, 
“[m]oral disapproval of this group, like a bare desire to harm the group, is 
an interest that is insufficient to satisfy rational basis review under the 
Equal Protection Clause.”237 
3.   Windsor III 
Most recently, the Supreme Court reviewed a Second Circuit decision238 
striking down Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act239 (DOMA).  The 
plaintiff, Edith Windsor, married her wife in Canada and subsequently 
resided in New York.240  Upon her wife’s death, Windsor was denied the 
benefit of a spousal deduction of federal estate taxes because DOMA’s 
definitions of “marriage” and “spouse” precluded the Internal Revenue 
Service from “recognizing Windsor as a spouse or the [same-sex] couple as 
married.”241  The Court concluded that since DOMA sought to injure the 
“very class New York [sought] to protect,” it violated both due process and 
equal protection principles.242  In doing so, however, the Court neither 
articulated the standard of review it was applying,243 nor, as in Romer,244 
did it address whether homosexuals constituted a quasi-suspect or suspect 
class.245 
 234. Id.  The Court ultimately concluded that the statute “further[ed] no legitimate state 
interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.”  
Id. at 578. 
 235. Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 236. Id. at 580. 
 237. Id. at 582. 
 238. See infra Part II.B.1.a (discussing “Windsor II”). 
 239. The Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7 (1996) (“In determining the meaning of 
any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or interpretation of the various 
administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States, the word ‘marriage’ means only a 
legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word ‘spouse’ 
refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”). 
 240. Windsor v. United States (Windsor II), 699 F.3d 169, 175 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 241. Id. 
 242. Windsor III, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2693 (2013) (“The Constitution’s guarantee of equality 
‘must at the very least mean that a bare congressional desire to harm a politically unpopular 
group cannot’ justify disparate treatment of that group.  In determining whether a law is 
motived by an improper animus or purpose, ‘[d]iscriminations of an unusual character’ 
especially require careful consideration.  DOMA cannot survive under these principles.”). 
 243. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 480 (9th Cir. 2014) 
(noting that the Court in Windsor III “did not expressly announce the level of scrutiny it 
applied to the equal protection claim at issue”). 
 244. See supra note 231 and accompanying text. 
 245. See Windsor III, 133 S. Ct. at 2706 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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The Court paid much attention to DOMA’s purpose and effect.246  It 
determined that DOMA’s “unusual deviation” from the practice of 
recognizing state definitions of marriage was “strong evidence” that the 
purpose and effect of the law was to “impose a disadvantage, a separate 
status, and so a stigma upon all who enter into same-sex marriages made 
lawful by the unquestioned authority of the States.”247  Moreover, the Court 
reasoned that DOMA’s “operation in practice” further evidenced this 
purpose.248 
Ultimately, the Court concluded that DOMA was invalid under the Fifth 
Amendment.249  It held that no legitimate purpose “[overcame] the purpose 
and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage 
laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”250 
B.   A New Quasi-Suspect Class: Batson May Prohibit 
Sexual Orientation–Based Strikes 
The Second and Ninth Circuits have decided that classifications based on 
sexual orientation require the application of heightened scrutiny.  Part II.B.1 
assesses cases holding that heightened scrutiny applies when reviewing 
laws that classify based on sexual orientation.  Part II.B.2 discusses the 
possibility of prohibiting peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation in 
circuits where such classifications are reviewed with heightened scrutiny, 
and the Ninth Circuit’s express decision to do so. 
1.   Homosexuals Are a Quasi-Suspect Class 
Entitled to Heightened Scrutiny 
In 2012, the Second Circuit became the first circuit to hold that 
heightened scrutiny applies to classifications based on sexual orientation.  
In 2014, the Ninth Circuit followed suit. 
 246. Id. at 2693–94 (majority opinion). 
 247. Id. at 2693.  The Court indicated that Congress’s stated purpose was to promote “an 
interest in protecting the traditional moral teachings reflected in heterosexual-only marriage 
laws.” Id.  Furthermore, the Court adopted the argument that the Act’s demonstrated purpose 
was to “ensure that if any State decides to recognize same-sex marriages, those unions will 
be treated as second-class marriages for the purposes of federal law.” Id. at 2693–94.  
“DOMA writes inequality into the entire United States Code.” Id. at 2694.  “DOMA’s 
principal effect is to identify a subset of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal.  
The principal purpose is to impose inequality, not for other reasons like governmental 
efficiency.  Responsibilities, as well as rights, enhance the dignity and integrity of the 
person.” Id. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. at 2696.  “The liberty protected by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
contains within it the prohibition against denying to any person the equal protection of the 
laws.” Id. at 2695 (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499–500 (1954)).  “While the 
Fifth Amendment itself withdraws from Government the power to degrade or demean in the 
way this law does, the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment makes that 
Fifth Amendment right all the more specific and all the better understood and preserved.” Id. 
 250. Id. at 2696. 
 
2022 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 83 
a.   The Second Circuit Applies Heightened Scrutiny 
to Review the Defense of Marriage Act:  Windsor II 
In its 2012 case, Windsor II,251 the Second Circuit considered whether a 
review of the constitutionality of Section Three of DOMA necessitated the 
application of heightened scrutiny.252 
The Second Circuit first recognized that several courts have read 
Supreme Court precedent as demanding the application of a more searching 
rational basis review when there are “historic patterns of disadvantage 
suffered by the group adversely affected by the statute.”253  It further stated, 
however, that the Supreme Court has never “expressly sanctioned” such 
modification of the rational basis standard.254  Accepting that there is 
sufficient “doctrinal instability in this area,” the Second Circuit avoided 
deciding which level of rational basis need be applied, as “if heightened 
scrutiny is available” no “permutation of rational basis review is 
needed.”255 
The court employed the Supreme Court’s four-factor suspect class 
inquiry256 and concluded that its review of Section Three of DOMA 
necessitated the application of heightened scrutiny.257  In applying this test, 
the court identified two of the four factors as merely “indicative” and not 
determinative of a group’s suspect class status.258  First, the court doubted 
whether there was “much left of the immutability theory.”259  It cited to the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Nyquist v. Mauclet,260 which rejected the 
argument that classifications based on alienage did not necessitate the 
application of strict scrutiny because alienage is not an immutable 
characteristic.261  Second, it recognized that the political powerlessness of a 
group was relevant, but neither necessary (“as the gender cases 
demonstrate”) nor sufficient (“as the example of minors illustrates,”262) to 
establish a suspect class.263  Nevertheless, despite the limited importance of 
these two factors, the Second Circuit determined that all four of the test’s 
factors justified the application of heightened scrutiny.264 
The court began with an “easy” conclusion that homosexuals have 
suffered a history of discrimination, a fact which was “not much in 
 251. 699 F.3d 169 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 252. Id. at 181. 
 253. Id. at 180 (quoting Massachusetts v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 682 F.3d 
1, 11 (1st Cir. 2012)). 
 254. Id. 
 255. Id. at 181. 
 256. See supra notes 201–05 and accompanying text. 
 257. Windsor II, 699 F.3d at 181. 
 258. Id. 
 259. Id. (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 442 n.10 (1985)). 
 260. 432 U.S. 1 (1977). 
 261. Windsor II, 699 F.3d at 181 (citing Nyquist, 432 U.S. at 9 n.11). 
 262. Id. (citing Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 472 n.24). 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at 181–82. 
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debate.”265  Looking only as far as the criminalization of homosexual 
activity in several states to find “telling proof of animus and discrimination 
against homosexuals,” the court quickly dismissed arguments that this 
history was insufficient to warrant the application of heightened scrutiny.266  
While it recognized that unlike racial minorities and women homosexuals 
have never been politically disenfranchised, Supreme Court precedent 
precluded this difference from being decisive.267  Moreover, the short 
history of discrimination against homosexuals, relative to that against 
women and racial minorities, did not avert the application of the heightened 
standard.268  Rather, in accordance with the majority of cases having 
“meaningfully considered the question,” the court found the ninety years of 
discrimination against homosexuals, beginning in the 1920s, sufficient to 
satisfy the “history of discrimination” factor.269 
With similar “ease,” the court concluded that homosexuality is a 
characteristic bearing no relation to the “ability to perform or contribute to 
society.”270  There are some characteristics, such as age or mental handicap, 
which “may arguably inhibit an individual’s ability to contribute to 
society.”271  Sexual orientation, however, is not among them.272  Quite 
oppositely, the court indicated, “[t]he aversion homosexuals experience” 
bears absolutely no relation to aptitude or performance.273 
The Second Circuit further concluded that homosexuality is a 
“sufficiently discernible characteristic to define a discrete minority 
class.”274  It rejected the argument that a defining characteristic must be 
both obvious and immutable.275  Instead, the court interpreted the test more 
broadly as whether there are “obvious, immutable, or distinguishing 
characteristics” that define the discrete group.276  Furthermore, the court 
indicated that whether a group-defining characteristic is obvious is not 
important.277  Rather the relevant inquiry is whether, when manifest, the 
 265. Id. at 182. 
 266. Id. 
 267. Id. (applying intermediate scrutiny in cases involving classifications based on 
illegitimacy even though children born out of wedlock were never disenfranchised (citing 
Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978)). 
 268. Id. (“[W]hether such discrimination existed in Babylon is neither here nor there.”). 
 269. Id. (citing Pedersen v. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 881 F. Supp. 2d 294, 318 (D. Conn. 
2012)). 
 270. Id. (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 441 (1985)). 
 271. Id. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 182–83. 
 274. Id. at 183. 
 275. Id. (“Classifications based on alienage, illegitimacy, and national origin are all 
subject to heightened scrutiny, even though these characteristics do not declare themselves, 
and often may be disclosed or suppressed as a matter of preference.  What seems to matter is 
whether the characteristic of the class calls down discrimination when it is manifest.”). 
 276. Id. (quoting Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602 (1987)). 
 277. Id. 
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characteristic invites discrimination.278  Homosexuality, the court reasoned, 
is a sufficiently distinguishing characteristic in this way.279 
Contemplating the last factor of the suspect class test, the court indicated 
that homosexuals did not have the power to protect themselves against 
“discrimination at the hands of the majoritarian political process.”280  
Recognizing the difficulty in determining whether homosexuals are actually 
underrepresented in the government, the court was instead persuaded by the 
small number of “acknowledged homosexuals” in positions of power and 
authority.281  The two posited explanations for this small number—hostility 
which excludes homosexuals from these positions or, alternatively, hostility 
which motivates homosexuals to keep their sexual orientation private—
were just as dispositive to the court as a statistical underrepresentation 
would have been.282  Furthermore, the court posited that these same 
hostilities would surely suppress at least some political activity by 
stigmatizing the open association with certain political agendas.283 
Ultimately, the analysis of these four factors led the court to define 
homosexuals as a quasi-suspect class entitled to intermediate scrutiny under 
the Fourteenth Amendment.284 
b.   The Ninth Circuit’s Decision to Apply Heightened Scrutiny 
to Classifications Based on Sexual Orientation:  
SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories 
The Ninth Circuit, in Smithkline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott 
Laboratories,285 specifically considered whether peremptory strikes could 
be exercised on the basis of sexual orientation.286  In the lower court, the 
plaintiff brought an action alleging that the manufacturer of an HIV drug 
violated the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing and antitrust 
laws.287  During voir dire, the defendant used its first peremptory challenge 
to remove the only self-identified gay juror from the venire.288  The 
plaintiff responded with a Batson challenge, alleging that the defendant’s 
peremptory strike was motivated by the juror’s sexual orientation.289  The 
trial judge rejected the Batson challenge, expressing doubt as to whether 
 278. Id. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 184. 
 281. Id. 
 282. Id. at 184–85 (stating that actual underrepresentation of homosexuals in positions of 
authority and power and hostility which causes the appearance of such “amounts to much the 
same thing”). 
 283. Id. 
 284. Id. at 185.  The mistreatment suffered by homosexuals “is not sufficient to require 
‘our most exacting scrutiny.’” Id. (quoting Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977)). 
 285. 740 F.3d 471 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 286. Id. at 474. 
 287. Id. 
 288. Id. at 474–75. 
 289. Id. at 475.  Counsel for plaintiff cited the involvement of AIDS medication in the 
litigation as the suspected motivation for the peremptory strike by the defendant. Id. 
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Batson applied to sexual orientation–based peremptory challenges, and the 
plaintiff subsequently appealed.290 
The Ninth Circuit, relying on the line drawn in J.E.B., reasoned that, if 
sexual orientation is a classification subject only to rational basis review, 
the lower court’s decision to reject the Batson challenge was 
unreviewable.291  Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit began by considering 
whether classifications based on sexual orientation are entitled to 
heightened scrutiny.292 
In making its determination, the court posited that, since the Supreme 
Court failed to articulate the standard of review it applied in Windsor III, it 
was necessary to review what the court “actually did.”293  Three aspects of 
the Supreme Court’s Windsor III analysis persuaded the Ninth Circuit that it 
engaged in heightened scrutiny.294 
First, the Supreme Court did not entertain possible post hoc 
rationalizations for the enactment of Section Three of DOMA.295  
Traditionally, laws survive rational basis review “if any state of facts 
reasonably may be conceived to justify” the classifications imposed by the 
law.296  In Windsor III, the Ninth Circuit explained, the Supreme Court did 
not “[conceive] of hypothetical justifications for [DOMA].”297  Nor did the 
Court consider any of the five rational bases offered by the Bipartisan Legal 
Advisory Group in its brief.298  Instead, the Court relied on DOMA’s 
legislative history to evaluate the “essence” of the law and considered its 
“design, purpose, and effect.”299  Moreover, the Court extensively 
discussed Congress’s “avowed purpose . . . to impose inequality,” as well as 
DOMA’s “demonstrated purpose” to support its conclusion that Section 
Three of DOMA was unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment.300  This 
consideration of Congress’s actual purpose and the failure to consider 
hypothetical rational bases, according to the Ninth Circuit, “is antithetical to 
the very concept of rational basis review.”301 
 290. Id. 
 291. Id. at 479–80. 
 292. Id. at 480. 
 293. Id. (explaining that when the Supreme Court has refrained from identifying its 
method of analysis, the Ninth Circuit analyzes the Supreme Court precedent, “by considering 
what the Court actually did, rather than by dissecting isolated pieces of text” (quoting Witt v. 
Dep’t of Air Force, 527 F.3d 806, 816 (9th Cir. 2008))). 
 294. Id.  The Ninth Circuit considered three factors it previously defined in Witt.  First, 
whether the Supreme Court considered possible post hoc rationalization for the law, as is 
required under rational basis review. Id.  Second, whether the Court required that the state 
interest in its action be “legitimate” as the Ninth Circuit stated is “traditionally the case in 
heightened scrutiny.” Id.  And finally, whether heightened scrutiny was applied in the cases 
relied upon by the Court. Id. at 480–81. 
 295. Id. at 481. 
 296. Id. (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 426 (1961)). 
 297. Id. 
 298. Id. at 481–82. 
 299. Id. at 481 (quoting Windsor III, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683, 2689 (2013)). 
 300. Id. at 482. 
 301. Id. 
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Second, the Supreme Court deemed Congress’s interest in enacting 
Section Three legitimate.302  More than that, however, the Court demanded 
that this legitimate purpose “justify disparate treatment of the group.”303  
Were the Court applying rational basis review, the Ninth Circuit concluded, 
it would not have identified a legitimate interest in order to “justify” the 
classification.304  Rational basis, contrastingly, is “unconcerned with the 
inequality that results from the challenged state action.”305  Yet Windsor III 
repeatedly refers to the harm, injury, and effect of DOMA on gays and 
lesbians, concluding that no purpose “overcomes” this effect.306  Moreover, 
the majority was concerned with the “public message sent by DOMA about 
the status occupied by gays and lesbians in our society,” which tends to 
impose second-class status on the group.307 
Absent among all of this concern was the “strong presumption” of 
constitutionality and the “extremely deferential posture” typical of rational 
basis review.308  Windsor III’s thorough consideration of DOMA’s actual 
purpose, the harm and injury DOMA inflicted on homosexuals, as well as 
its balancing of the two, according to the Ninth Circuit, simply do not 
comport with traditional rational basis review.309 
Lastly, the Ninth Circuit considered what it described as “the least 
important factor”:  whether Windsor III cited and relied upon cases 
employing heightened scrutiny.310  While the relevant portion of the 
Windsor III opinion relies on few cases,311 the Ninth Circuit found that the 
Court relied both on rational basis and heightened scrutiny cases.312  Thus, 
while the Court’s reliance was not decisive, it tended to support the 
application of heightened scrutiny.313 
Thus, applying the Witt test, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Windsor III 
compelled the application of heightened scrutiny in equal protection cases 
involving classifications based on sexual orientation.314  This 
 302. Id. 
 303. Id. (quoting Windsor III, 133 S. Ct. at 2693). 
 304. Id. 
 305. Id. (applying the presumption that state legislatures “have acted within their 
constitutional power despite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality.” 
(citing McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425–26 (1961))). 
 306. Id. at 483 (“The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes the 
purpose and effect to disparage and injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws, 
sought to protect in personhood and dignity.” (quoting Windsor III, 133 S. Ct. at 2696)). 
 307. Id. at 482–83. 
 308. Id. at 483. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. The Court relied on Romer, Lawrence, and Department of Agriculture v. Moreno, 
413 U.S. 528 (1973). Id.  Romer applied rational basis review. Id.  According to both the 
Supreme Court and the Ninth Circuit, Moreno employed “a more searching form of rational 
basis review.” Id.  Moreover, the Ninth Circuit’s analysis of the Lawrence decision in Witt, 
led it to conclude that the Court applied heightened scrutiny in that case as well. Id. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. at 481. 
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determination, however, did not similarly compel the prohibition of 
peremptory strikes on the basis of sexual orientation.315 
2.   Heightened Scrutiny:  Necessary But Not Sufficient to Extend Batson  
The Ninth Circuit pointed out that “[i]n J.E.B., the Supreme Court did 
not state definitively whether heightened scrutiny is sufficient to warrant 
Batson’s protection or merely necessary.”316  Instead, the Court stated, 
“parties may . . . exercise their peremptory challenges to remove from the 
venire any group or class of individuals normally subject to ‘rational basis’ 
review.”317 
Analyzing the reasoning and rationale of J.E.B., the Ninth Circuit 
prohibited peremptory challenges based on sexual orientation.318  The court 
pointed out that J.E.B. “took Batson, a case about the use of race in jury 
selection, and applied its principles to discrimination against women.”319  
In doing so, the Ninth Circuit reasoned, the Supreme Court recognized that 
even groups with a history of discrimination significantly differing from 
that of African Americans, may be entitled to the protection of Batson.320  
Accordingly, the Court’s articulated purposes in deciding J.E.B. and Batson 
were applied, and the history of discrimination experienced by gays and 
lesbians independently analyzed, to justify the Ninth Circuit’s prohibition 
of sexual orientation–based peremptory strikes.321 
First, the Ninth Circuit recognized that, much like strikes on the basis of 
race and gender, peremptory challenges exercised on the basis of sexual 
orientation deprive individuals of the right to participate in the judicial 
system “on account of a characteristic that has nothing to do with their 
fitness to serve.”322  While homosexuals have not been systematically 
excluded from juries in the same open manner as women and African 
Americans, the “unique experiences of gays and lesbians,” and the history 
of government-endorsed discrimination against them, compel the same 
Batson protection.323  Certainly, homosexuality is not a characteristic 
 315. Id. at 484. 
 316. Id. 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. 
 320. Id. 
 321. Id. at 484–85. 
 322. Id. at 485. 
 323. Id. 
In the first half of the twentieth century, public attention was preoccupied with 
homosexual “infiltration” of the federal government.  Gays and lesbians were 
dismissed from civilian employment in the federal government at a rate of sixty 
per month.  Discrimination in employment was not limited to the federal 
government; local and state governments also excluded homosexuals, and 
professional licensing boards often revoked licenses on account of homosexuality.  
In 1985, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case in which a woman had been 
fired from her job as a guidance counselor in a public school because of her 
sexuality.  Indeed, gays and lesbians were thought to be so contrary to our 
conception of citizenship that they were made inadmissible under a provision of 
our immigration laws that required the Immigration and Naturalization Service 
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obvious on the face of a juror.324  Until quite recently,325 however, gays and 
lesbians did not identify themselves as such for fear that “being openly gay 
[would result] in significant discrimination.”326  Second, the Ninth Circuit 
stated that the Constitution cannot perpetuate the very “state-sponsored 
group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice” that lead 
to this forced privacy in the first place.327  For all of these reasons, the 
Ninth Circuit determined that peremptory strikes based on sexual 
orientation must be prohibited under Batson.328 
In the Second Circuit, after Windsor II, homosexuals are no longer a 
group “normally subject to rational basis review.”329  As such, under J.E.B. 
they are not a group that automatically can be peremptorily removed from 
the venire in courts where Windsor II is binding.330  While this suggests 
that sexual orientation-based strikes may be prohibited in the Second 
Circuit, the court has not yet decided the issue. 
While the Second and Ninth Circuits are the only two circuit courts to 
define homosexuals as a class entitled to heightened scrutiny, several 
district courts have decided similarly since then.331  Several circuits and 
district courts, however, have also declined to do so.332 
C.   Homosexuals Are Not Entitled to Heightened Scrutiny or Batson 
Protection 
As the Second Circuit pointed out in Windsor II, there is much “doctrinal 
instability” surrounding the issue of the appropriate standard of review to be 
applied to classifications based on sexual orientation.333  Only the Second 
and Ninth Circuits have expressly decided that homosexuals constitute a 
(INS) to exclude individuals “afflicted with psychopathic personality.”  It was not 
until 1990 that the INS ceased to interpret that category as including gays and 
lesbians.  It is only recently that gay men and women gained the right to be open 
about their sexuality in the course of their military service.  As one scholar put it, 
throughout the twentieth century, gays and lesbians were the “anticitizen.” 
Id. at 484–85. 
 324. See id. at 485. 
 325. Id. at 485–86 (“[I]n 1985, only one quarter of Americans reported knowing someone 
who was gay.  By 2000, this number increased to 75 percent of Americans.”). 
 326. Id. at 485. 
 327. Id. at 486 (quoting J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994)). 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 479. 
 330. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143. 
 331. See, e.g., Latta v. Otter, 19 F. Supp. 3d 1054, 1074–77 (D. Idaho 2014) (relying on 
SmithKline when deciding that heightened scrutiny applied to sexual orientation 
classifications when it considered a § 1983 action brought by two same-sex couples seeking 
to marry in Idaho and two same-sex couples seeking to have their out-of-state marriages 
recognized by Idaho); Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d, 1036, 1054 (S.D. Ohio 2014) (using 
SmithKline as precedent to apply intermediate scrutiny when invalidating a law prohibiting 
the recognition of same-sex marriages performed in other jurisdictions); Wolf v. Walker, 986 
F. Supp. 2d 982, 1010 (W.D. Wis. 2014) (agreeing with SmithKline that sexual orientation–
based classifications necessitate the application of heightened scrutiny but not deeming 
SmithKline binding precedent). 
 332. See infra notes 387–91 and accompanying text. 
 333. Windsor II, 699 F.3d 169, 181 (2d Cir. 2012). 
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quasi-suspect class entitled to heightened scrutiny.334  Other circuits apply 
rational basis review to such classifications.  Part II.C.1 examines 
interpretations of Supreme Court precedent inapposite to the Second and 
Ninth Circuits’ view, that sexual orientation–based classifications are 
entitled to mere rational basis review.  Part II.C.2 discusses the ineligibility, 
under J.E.B., of sexual orientation–based peremptory strikes to be 
prohibited in jurisdictions adopting this view and the arguments against 
extending Batson to prohibit such strikes. 
1.   Sexual Orientation–Based Classifications Are Reviewed 
for Rational Basis:  DeBoer v. Snyder 
The Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of Windsor III, and the opinion that the 
Supreme Court in its actions, rather than its words, has been applying 
heightened scrutiny to sexual orientation–based classifications, is certainly 
not a unanimous one.  The Sixth Circuit’s recent interpretation of rational 
basis review, as applied to the prohibition of same-sex marriage precipitated 
by the Michigan Marriage Amendment (MMA) in DeBoer v. Snyder,335 is 
an appropriate example of just that. 
DeBoer reviewed the constitutionality of the voter-approved MMA, 
which prohibited same-sex marriage.336  The court addressed the question 
from many different perspectives, considering arguments for and against the 
MMA’s validity under theories of “rational basis review; animus; . . . [and] 
suspect classificatio[n],” among others.337  Under no theory, however, did 
the court find a reason for “constitutionalizing the definition of marriage 
and for removing the issue from the place it has been since the Founding:  
in the hands of state voters.”338 
a.   Rational Basis Review 
The Sixth Circuit began its rational basis analysis by defining the 
deference to be effected when applying this standard of review, stating, 
“[s]o long as judges can conceive of some ‘plausible’ reason for the law—
any plausible reason, even one that did not motivate the legislators who 
enacted it—the law must stand, no matter how unfair, unjust, or unwise the 
judges may consider it as citizens.”339  Ultimately, the court found two such 
bases sufficient to meet this “low bar,”340 the first of which is the 
furtherance of a government interest in regulating sex341 and in creating 
 334. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 335. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 336. Id. at 396–97. 
 337. Id. at 402 (“There are many ways . . . to look at this question:  originalism; rational 
basis review; animus; fundamental rights; suspect classifications; evolving meaning.  The 
parties in one way or another have invoked them all.”). 
 338. Id. at 403. 
 339. Id. at 404 (citing Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 330 (1993)). 
 340. Id. 
 341. Id. (“One starts from the premise that governments got into the business of defining 
marriage, and remain in the business of defining marriage, not to regulate love but to 
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stable family units for the creation of children.342  The court viewed the 
MMA as a state-created incentive for a couple to “stay together for 
purposes of rearing offspring.”343  It also held that this legislation is not 
irrational, but rather, recognizes the “biological reality” that same-sex 
couples do not have children in the same way that heterosexual couples 
do.344  The same risk of unintended offspring, therefore, does not exist.345 
In recognizing this basis, the court also considered a countervailing 
policy argument in favor of extending marriage laws to gay couples: gay 
couples are no less capable than straight couples of sharing loving, 
affectionate, and committed relationships or of raising children and 
providing stable families for them.346  Ultimately, however, the court stated 
that the “signature feature” of rational basis review is that legislation will 
not be invalidated simply because the government has done too much or too 
little in addressing a policy question.347  Moreover, rational basis review 
does not “empower federal courts to ‘subject’ legislative line-drawing to 
‘courtroom’ factfinding” which tends to favor a different policy.348  Nor 
can such found facts be the basis of a ruling of unconstitutionality.349 
The second rational basis the Sixth Circuit recognized was a state’s right 
to “wait and see” before legislating inapposite to traditional societal 
norms.350  While the plaintiffs argued that the state has acted irrationally in 
its continued adoption of the traditional definition of marriage “in the face 
of changing social mores,” the court disagreed.351  Eleven years after 
Massachusetts recognized gay marriage, “the clock has not run on assessing 
the benefits and burdens of expanding the definition of marriage.”352  
Moreover, the court decided, the question of whether maintaining the 
traditional definition of marriage is worth its cost is one for the legislature, 
not “life-tenured judges.”353  To further this point, the court concluded its 
rational basis analysis by rearticulating its undertaking, stating, “[o]ur task 
under the Supreme Court’s precedents is to decide whether the law has 
regulate sex, most especially the intended and unintended effects of male-female intercourse.  
Imagine a society without marriage.  It does not take long to envision problems that might 
result from an absence of rules about how to handle the natural effects of male-female 
intercourse:  children.”). 
 342. Id. at 404–05 (“People . . . may well need the government’s encouragement to create 
and maintain stable relationships within which children may flourish.  It is not society’s laws 
or for that matter any one religion’s laws . . . [a]nd governments typically are not second-
guessed under the Constitution for prioritizing how they tackle such issues.” (citing 
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1970))). 
 343. Id. at 405. 
 344. Id. 
 345. Id. 
 346. Id. 
 347. Id. 
 348. Id. (citing FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 315 (1993)). 
 349. Id. 
 350. Id. at 406. 
 351. Id. 
 352. Id. 
 353. Id. at 408. 
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some conceivable basis, not to gauge how that rationale stacks up against 
the arguments on the other side.”354 
b.   Animus 
Next, the Sixth Circuit explained the very lack of “traditional deference” 
present in cases like Romer and Lawrence and relied upon by the Ninth 
Circuit in SmithKline.355  It posited that the cases in which the Supreme 
Court has struck down state laws under rational basis review are those in 
which “the novelty of the law and the targeting of a single group for 
disfavored treatment” are apparent.356  Distinguishing this case from cases 
like Romer and Cleburne, the court pointed out that this law was not 
novel.357  In fact, it codified “a long-existing, widely held social norm 
already reflected in state law.”358  Moreover, quoting Windsor III, the court 
pointed out that the heterosexual nature of traditional marriage “had been 
thought of by most people as essential to the very definition of that term 
and to its role and function throughout the history of civilization.”359 
Further distinguishing this case from other Supreme Court precedents, 
the court indicated that Michigan’s decision to define marriage in its 
constitution was not unusual and lacked the “kind of malice or unthinking 
prejudice the Constitution prohibits.”360  The decisions in Cleburne and 
Romer, the Sixth Circuit posited, turned on whether “anything but prejudice 
to the affected class could explain the law.”361  The Court, in those cases, 
decided that there were none.  Here, the Sixth Circuit concluded, plenty of 
alternative explanations existed.362 
c.   Quasi-Suspect Class 
Next, the Sixth Circuit considered whether the Supreme Court’s four-part 
test deemed homosexuals a quasi-suspect class necessitating the application 
of heightened scrutiny.363  In opposition to both the Ninth and Second 
Circuits’ analyses and considering only two of the four factors, the court 
found that homosexuals do not constitute a quasi-suspect class under this 
test.364 
 354. Id. 
 355. Id. 
 356. Id. (stating that zoning code applied only to homes for the intellectually disabled in a 
“neighborhood that apparently wanted nothing to do with them”); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 
620, 623 (1996) (considering validity of state wide initiative that denied only gays the 
protection of existing antidiscrimination laws). 
 357. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388, 408 (6th Cir. 2014). 
 358. Id. 
 359. Id. (quoting Windsor III, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2689 (2013)). 
 360. Id. 
 361. Id. at 410. 
 362. Id. 
 363. Id. at 413. 
 364. See id. at 413–16. 
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The argument that homosexuals are a quasi-suspect class faced two 
“impediments”:  the first, the Sixth Circuit’s own precedent indicating that 
rational basis review applies to sexual orientation classifications,365 and the 
second, the fact that the Supreme Court has never held that sexual 
orientation classifications should receive heightened review and “has not 
recognized a new suspect class in more than four decades.”366 
First, the Sixth Circuit recognized that homosexuals have suffered a 
“lamentable” history of discrimination.367  It also pointed out, however, that 
the traditional definition of marriage being challenged in this case 
developed “independently of this record of discrimination.”368  Second, the 
Sixth Circuit disagreed with the Ninth Circuit in concluding that 
homosexuals as a group are not so politically powerless that “extraordinary 
protection from the majoritarian political process” is required.369  Instead, 
the court reasoned that since gay marriage was legalized in Massachusetts 
eleven years ago, homosexuals have enjoyed “nearly as many successes as 
defeats and a widely held assumption that the future holds more promise 
than the past.”370  As such, the court concluded that the Fourteenth 
Amendment is not designed to protect a group from the reality of 
democratic initiatives, “some succeed, some fail.”371  Accordingly, under 
the Sixth Circuit’s analysis, homosexuals do not constitute a quasi-suspect 
class.372 
d.  Windsor III As Precedent 
Lastly, the Sixth Circuit considered whether Windsor III, as plaintiffs’ 
claimed and the Ninth Circuit held, applied heightened scrutiny.373  It held 
 365. Id. at 413 (citing Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 438 (6th Cir. 2012); 
Scarbrough v. Morgan Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 470 F.3d 250, 260–61 (6th Cir. 2006); Stemler v. 
City of Florence, 126 F.3d 856, 873–74 (6th Cir. 1997)). 
 366. Id. 
 367. Id. 
 368. Id.  “The traditional definition of marriage goes back thousands of years and spans 
almost every society in history.  By contrast, ‘American laws targeting same-sex couples did 
not develop until the last third of the 20th century.’” Id. (quoting Lawrence v. Texas, 539 
U.S. 558, 570 (2003)). 
 369. Id. at 415. 
This is not a setting in which dysfunction mars the political process.  It is not a 
setting in which the recalcitrance of Jim Crow demands judicial, rather than we-
can’t-wait-forever legislative, answers.  It is not a setting in which time shows that 
even a potentially powerful group cannot make headway on issues of equality.  It 
is not a setting where a national crisis—the Depression—seemingly demanded 
constitutional innovation.  And it is not a setting, most pertinently, in which the 
local, state, and federal governments historically disenfranchised the suspect class, 
as they did with African Americans and women. 
Id. 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. at 413. 
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that it did not.374  Rather, the Sixth Circuit placed Windsor III in its above-
mentioned “animus” category with Romer and Cleburne.375 
The Sixth Circuit interpreted Windsor III as a decision mostly about 
federalism rather than as an endorsement of the application of heightened 
scrutiny.376  It found that the Supreme Court resolved Windsor III on the 
“Romer ground,” that “anomalous exercises of power targeting a single 
group raise suspicion that bigotry rather than legitimate policy is afoot.”377  
The reason DOMA was anomalous, the court posited, was because the 
federal statute at issue “trespassed” on New York’s authority to define 
marriage.378  Without such an anomaly, there is no reason to infer that a 
state law’s purpose was to impose a disadvantage, separate status, or stigma 
on same-sex couples, and traditional rational basis would apply.379 
2.   Other Circuits Hold That Sexual Orientation–Based Strikes 
Are Permissible 
Only the Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have specifically 
considered whether peremptory challenges based on sexual orientation are 
eligible for prohibition under J.E.B.380  Both the Eighth and Eleventh 
Circuits neglected to extend Batson to prohibit sexual orientation–based 
peremptory challenges. 
a.   Sexual Orientation–Based Strikes Are Permissible 
Unless the Supreme Court Holds Otherwise 
First, all circuits which apply rational basis review to classifications 
based on sexual orientation are precluded from extending Batson to prohibit 
peremptory strikes on the basis of sexual orientation.381  J.E.B. explicitly 
permits peremptory strikes based on a characteristic defining a group 
entitled to rational basis review.382  Accordingly, in the Sixth Circuit, and 
other circuits applying rational basis review, sexual orientation–based 
peremptory challenges are necessarily permissible.  Unsurprisingly, the 
Eleventh and Eighth Circuits declined to extend Batson when they had the 
opportunity, due primarily to the Supreme Court’s failure to do so. 
Prior to the Ninth Circuit’s decision in SmithKline, the Eighth Circuit 
chose not to extend Batson in United States v. Blaylock.383  Not electing to 
 374. Id. 
 375. Id. at 414. 
 376. Id. at 413. 
 377. Id. at 414. 
 378. Id. 
 379. Id. 
 380. See SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 475 (9th Cir. 2014); 
Sneed v. Florida Dep’t of Corr., 496 F. App’x 20 (11th Cir. 2012); United States v. 
Blaylock, 421 F.3d 758 (8th Cir. 2005). 
 381. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994) (holding group must be 
entitled to more than rational basis review to benefit from the protection of Batson). 
 382. See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text. 
 383. 421 F.3d 758, 769–70 (8th Cir. 2005). 
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engage in the Supreme Court’s four-part quasi-suspect inquiry, the Eighth 
Circuit reasoned that, “[a]lthough the California Supreme Court has held 
sexual orientation should be a protected class for jury selection purposes, 
and the Ninth Circuit has assumed, without deciding, sexual orientation 
qualifies as a Batson classification, neither the Supreme Court nor this 
circuit has so held.”384  Similarly, in Sneed v. Florida Department of 
Corrections,385 the Eleventh Circuit dismissed an ineffective assistance of 
counsel claim based on an attorney’s failure to object to a peremptory strike 
of a homosexual juror, stating, “the Supreme Court has never held that 
homosexuality is a protected class for purposes of analyzing discrimination 
in jury selection under Batson.”386 
Moreover, since the Ninth Circuit’s decision in SmithKline, several 
district courts have declined to adopt its rationale for want of binding 
precedent.  In Geiger v. Kitzhaber,387 the District Court of Oregon refused 
to consider SmithKline binding precedent.388  It reasoned that at least one 
judge of the Ninth Circuit made a sua sponte call for a rehearing en banc.389  
Thus, no mandate issued from the case and it is not yet a final and binding 
decision.390  While the court recognized that it could independently reach 
the same conclusion as the SmithKline court, it ultimately determined that 
was not necessary in this case.391 
b.   Batson Should Not Be Extended to Prohibit Peremptory Strikes 
Based on Sexual Orientation 
Even if the Sixth Circuit’s view is rejected, and homosexuals are deemed 
a quasi-suspect class, it must be independently considered whether Batson 
should be expanded to prohibit sexual orientation–based peremptory strikes.  
This section will discuss the view, often appearing in dissenting or 
concurring opinions, that Batson’s principles should not be applied to 
prohibit peremptory strikes based on any characteristics other than race. 
In Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in J.E.B., she warned of the potential 
costs the Court’s extension to gender might have on the value of the 
peremptory challenge.392  The peremptory challenge’s purpose is to enable 
parties to impanel fair and impartial juries.393  “[B]y enabling each side to 
exclude those jurors it believes will be most partial toward the other,” 
extreme biases for one party or another are eliminated from the venire.394  
The very nature of a peremptory strike—that it is exercised without a stated 
 384. Id. at 769. 
 385. 496 F. App’x 20 (11th Cir. 2012). 
 386. Id. at 27. 
 387. 994 F. Supp. 2d 1128 (D. Or. 2014). 
 388. Id. at 1141. 
 389. Id. 
 390. Id. 
 391. Id. 
 392. See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 147–51 (1994) (O’Connor, J., 
concurring). 
 393. Id. at 147. 
 394. Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 484 (1990). 
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reason—is the source of its value.395  This nature allows lawyers to strike 
jurors on the basis of their experience, on often “inarticulable” clues and 
hunches.396 
According to Justice O’Connor, with each constitutional limit on the use 
of peremptory challenges, “we force lawyers to articulate what we know is 
often inarticulable.”397  In doing so, peremptory challenges become “less 
discretionary” and biased jurors are more likely to make it onto the jury.398  
In its extension of Batson to gender-based peremptory strikes, the Court 
“[took] a step closer to eliminating the peremptory challenge, and 
diminished the ability of litigants to act on sometimes accurate gender-
based assumptions about juror attitudes.”399  Analogously, again extending 
Batson to prohibit sexual orientation–based peremptory challenges will 
further deplete the value of the procedure.400 
Moreover, in his J.E.B. dissent, Justice Scalia doubted whether the 
Constitution supports the limitation of the exercise of peremptory strikes at 
all.401  He reasoned that since all groups are equally subject to the 
peremptory challenge, “it is hard to see how any group is denied equal 
protection.”402  Justice Scalia also challenged the majority’s limitation of 
Batson’s scope based on the standard of review to which a group is 
entitled.403  The majority rejected the respondent’s argument that the 
peremptory challenge of the men in this case furthered the government’s 
 395. Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 220 (1965). 
 396. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 148. 
 397. Id. 
 398. Id. 
 399. Id. at 149–50.  “[T]o say that gender makes no difference as a matter of law is not to 
say that gender makes no difference as a matter of fact.” Id. at 149.  Saying gender does not 
matter as a matter of law is also somewhat contradictory to past fair cross section cases 
holding that woman bring a unique perspective and set of experiences to the jury. Id. at 157–
58 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
If asked whether the racial or gender composition of a jury might have anything to 
do with its eventual verdict, most Americans would probably agree that it does.  
The assumption underlying this opinion is that men and women, blacks and whites, 
the rich and the poor, may see the world in very different ways and that jurors’ 
differing world views may color their impressions of a case so much so that 
different jurors may reach different decisions about a just verdict. 
SEAN G. OVERLAND, THE JUROR FACTOR:   RACE AND GENDER IN AMERICA’S CIVIL COURTS 
11 (1973).  “[R]esearch on juror decision-making in criminal trials with racial undertones, 
such as cases in which the victim and the defendant are from different racial backgrounds, 
has shown that blacks and whites often view the case very differently.” Id. at 20.  A national 
opinion poll taken to measure reactions to the O.J. Simpson trial, for example, revealed that 
77 percent of white poll takers thought Simpson was guilty, while only 29 percent of black 
poll takers thought he should be convicted. Id.  Moreover, studies show that women are more 
likely to convict in rape cases than are men. REID HASTIE ET AL., INSIDE THE JURY 140–41 
(1983). 
 400. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 149–50 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 401. Id. at 159 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 402. Id.  Justice Scalia states that he might think differently if a pattern of peremptory 
strikes evidenced the systematic exclusion of a group from the venire. Id. at 160.  He 
indicates that here, that was not the case. Id.  For every man stricken from the venire by one 
party, a woman was stricken by the other. Id. 
 403. Id. at 160–61. 
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interest in procuring an impartial jury by eliminating a group that may have 
been partial to the defendants.404  The majority also stated that it refused to 
accept an argument based on “the very stereotype[s] the law condemns.”405  
Justice Scalia, however, failed to see a reason why the law condemns 
stereotyping of groups entitled to heightened or strict scrutiny but not those 
entitled to rational basis review.406  Accordingly, he questioned whether 
characteristic-based strikes could even rationally further the government’s 
interest in impaneling an impartial jury.407 
Justice Scalia also expressed a concern for the cost of this, and any 
further, extension of Batson.408  Stating that “there really is no substitute for 
the peremptory,” he reasoned that criminal defendants would be most 
affected by the majority’s decision.409  Moreover, recognizing that the 
“biases that go along with group characteristics tend to be biases that the 
juror himself does not perceive,” it would be “fruitless” to inquire about 
them.410  Without a fully powerful peremptory strike, therefore, many 
jurors’ subliminal prejudices will go unchallenged.411 
It is clear that there are both costs and benefits to extending Batson to 
prohibit sexual orientation–based peremptory challenges.  Yet there are 
equally crippling costs and meaningful benefits to maintaining the status 
quo.  It now must be considered whether, in the Batson realm, we can have 
our cake and eat it too. 
III.   BATSON’S HOLDING SHOULD BE BOTH NARROWED AND EXPANDED 
Any proposed change to the Batson regime must consider the two 
constitutional rights affected by it:  a criminal defendant’s Sixth 
Amendment right to an impartial jury and a juror’s Fourteenth Amendment 
right to equal protection under the laws.412  When Batson was decided, the 
Supreme Court seemingly turned its focus away from maintaining a 
powerful peremptory strike and prioritized the safeguard of jurors’ equal 
protection rights.  This Note attempts to preserve that priority but also 
revitalize the power of the peremptory challenge. 
Part III.A delves into the inconsistencies plaguing the Batson regime, 
exploring the limits J.E.B. places on Batson and the flaws of J.E.B.’s 
limiting principle.  Part III.B proposes that Batson be both narrowed and 
expanded to better balance the two constitutional rights at issue. 
 404. Id. at 160. 
 405. Id. at 161. 
 406. Id. 
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 408. Id. at 161–62. 
 409. Id. at 162. 
 410. Id. 
 411. Id. 
 412. See supra notes 43–46, 109–62 and accompanying text. 
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A.   The Batson Regime’s Plague:  Inconsistency 
There are two reasons the current Batson framework is ineffective.  First, 
the stated and apparent purposes of Batson and its progeny are inconsistent 
with Batson’s scope.  While Batson’s rationale can seemingly be employed 
to protect jurors from discrimination based on characteristics other than race 
and gender, J.E.B. greatly hinders that possibility.413  Second, Batson 
rigidly applies standards of judicial review in a way that creates a 
constitutional legal fiction.  Under this application, as a matter of 
constitutional law, race and gender never have a relevant impact on a 
juror’s ability to be impartial, whereas a juror’s sexual orientation always 
does.414 
1.   The Batson Regime’s Purpose Seeks to Protect More Groups 
than J.E.B.’s Limiting Principle Would Allow 
When Batson was decided, both its holding and its purpose were very 
focused.415  The Supreme Court sought only to eradicate the racially 
discriminatory exercise of peremptory strikes by prosecutors.416  This focus 
preserved the value of the peremptory strike and strictly limited Batson’s 
application.417  As Batson’s application and purpose have been expanded, 
and that focus diluted, a limiting principle was necessary to maintain the 
utility of the peremptory challenge.418 
In J.E.B., the Court articulated the needed limiting principle.419  While 
peremptory strikes based on race and gender were prohibited, parties could 
still exercise peremptory challenges against any group “normally subject to 
‘rational basis’ review.”420  This section discusses why Batson’s broadly 
understood purpose cannot be reconciled with J.E.B.’s explicit allowance of 
discriminatory peremptory strikes against certain groups. 
a.   Batson and J.E.B.:  The Reason Peremptory Strikes 
Based on Race and Gender Are Prohibited 
In both Batson and J.E.B., the Supreme Court offered several rationales 
for its limitations on the exercise of peremptory challenges.  First, when 
deciding Batson, the Court largely relied on the principles set forth in 
Strauder, indicating that the purposeful discrimination employed during 
jury selection violated a defendant’s Equal Protection rights.421  Elaborating 
further, the Court specified that the state unconstitutionally discriminated 
 413. See infra Part III.A.1. 
 414. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 415. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 416. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 417. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 418. See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text. 
 419. See supra notes 180–82 and accompanying text. 
 420. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143 (1994). 
 421. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. 
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against excluded jurors by relying on race to assess their competence.422  
“A person’s race,” the Court explained, “simply ‘is unrelated to his fitness 
as a juror.’”423  Moreover, the Court concluded that the injuries precipitated 
by purposeful discrimination extended beyond the courtroom to undermine 
the public’s confidence in the “fairness of our system of justice.”424 
In J.E.B., the Supreme Court responded to several arguments that 
Batson’s rationale could not be applied to justify the prohibition of gender-
based peremptory challenges.425  Analogizing, the Court ultimately held 
that, like race, gender “is an unconstitutional proxy for juror competence 
and impartiality.”426  In concluding so, the Court cited the history of 
discrimination against women in the United States, deciding that in order to 
expand Batson, the Court 
need not determine . . . whether women or racial minorities have suffered 
more at the hands of discriminatory state actors during the decades of our 
Nation’s history.  It is necessary only to acknowledge that “our Nation has 
had a long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination” . . . .427 
Moreover, J.E.B.’s holding, extending Batson to prohibit gender-based 
strikes, implies that narrowly viewing Batson’s purpose as specific to race 
is untenable.  The Court reasoned broadly that, “[W]hether the trial is 
criminal or civil, potential jurors, as well as litigants, have an equal 
protection right to jury selection procedures that are free from state-
sponsored group stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical 
prejudice.”428  The Court recognized that veniremen “have the right not to 
be excluded summarily because of discriminatory and stereotypical 
presumptions that reflect and reinforce patterns of historical 
discrimination.”429  In making these broad statements, the Court left a 
serious question unanswered:  Why only race and gender? 
b.   Inconsistencies Between the Court’s Limiting Principle 
and its Reasoning 
Batson’s rationale, especially as it has been more recently interpreted in 
J.E.B., can seemingly be employed to justify the prohibition of peremptory 
strikes based on other cognizable group characteristics.  The Supreme Court 
explicitly hindered courts from doing so, however, when it articulated 
J.E.B.’s limiting principle. 
Admittedly, the need for such a limiting principle is quite impressive.  
Peremptory strikes serve several important functions, not the least of which, 
 422. Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986). 
 423. Id. at 87 (quoting Thiel v. S. Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 227 (1946)). 
 424. See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
 425. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 129, 136. 
 426. Id. at 129. 
 427. Id. at 136; see supra note 161 and accompanying text. 
 428. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 128.  “The community is harmed by the State’s participation in 
the perpetuation of invidious group stereotypes and the inevitable loss of confidence in our 
judicial system that state-sanctioned discrimination in the courtroom engenders.” Id. at 140. 
 429. Id. at 141–42. 
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is its status as an important procedural safeguard of a criminal defendant’s 
right to an impartial jury.430  The further limited the exercise of peremptory 
challenges becomes, the less able defendants are to protect that right.431  
The issue is not at all that a limiting principle exists, but rather that the 
chosen limiting principle quite seriously fails to serve Batson’s purposes. 
Consider that the groups Batson protects are not uniquely vulnerable to 
discrimination, whereas, at least one group to which J.E.B. denies this 
protection, is vulnerable.  Currently, Batson and J.E.B. protect two groups 
that, historically, have been rather immune to discrimination:  whites and 
men.432  In Batson, the Supreme Court assessed the constitutionality of 
peremptory strikes excluding blacks from a jury.433  It held more broadly, 
however, that “race” could not motivate a strike.434  This protects whites 
from discrimination during voir dire as much as it protects blacks.435  
Similarly, and quite strangely, J.E.B. cited the history of discrimination 
against women to justify its conclusion that the respondent’s gender-based 
strikes against men were unconstitutional.436  Yet, in all but two circuits, 
the level of judicial scrutiny applied to classifications based on sexual 
orientation renders the history of discrimination against homosexuals 
irrelevant to justify Batson’s extension.437 
c.   Sexual Orientation:  An Example of the Inconsistency 
Sexual orientation is an obvious illustration of the incongruence of 
Batson’s rationales and J.E.B.’s limiting principle.  While J.E.B. prevents 
Batson from being applied to prohibit sexual orientation–based peremptory 
strikes in all but two circuits, Batson and J.E.B.’s rationales effortlessly 
justify their prohibition.  When deciding whether to prohibit peremptory 
strikes based on race and gender, the Court considered several issues.  
These include:  (1) whether a characteristic is related to one’s fitness as a 
juror, (2) whether discrimination against a group “undermines” the public’s 
confidence in the justice system, and (3) whether the group defined by the 
characteristic has historically experienced discrimination.438  Consider 
these factors as applied to sexual orientation. 
First, sexual orientation, like race and gender, is entirely unrelated to a 
juror’s ability to impartially evaluate a case.439  One need not be an expert 
of any kind to realize that sexual orientation is not a characteristic having 
any effect on one’s intelligence, ability to listen, reason, or apply the law to 
 430. See supra Part I.A.1 (discussing merits of peremptory challenge procedure). 
 431. See supra Part II.C.2.b. 
 432. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding race-based peremptory strikes 
are unconstitutional); see also J.E.B., 511 U.S. 127 (holding that gender-based peremptory 
strikes are unconstitutional). 
 433. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 434. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 435. See supra Part I.B.2. 
 436. See supra notes 158–62 and accompanying text. 
 437. See supra Part II.B.2.; supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text. 
 438. See supra Part III.A.1.a. 
 439. See supra notes 265–69 and accompanying text. 
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a set of facts.  Not only is this issue “not much in debate,” but a majority of 
cases which have “meaningfully considered” the question so hold.440 
Second, as the Court stated in J.E.B., jurors have a right not to be 
“summarily” dismissed based on assumptions which tend to reinforce 
historical prejudice.441  Such an allowance would send a message to the 
public that certain individuals are “presumed unqualified by state actors to 
decide important questions.”442  In fact, it seems certain that permitting 
citizens to be dismissed from juries based solely on their sexual orientation, 
or any characteristic not affecting their fitness as a juror, perpetuates this 
appearance of unfairness, and results in a “loss of confidence” in the 
judicial system.443 
Third, as recognized by the Second Circuit in Windsor II, homosexuals 
have endured government-sponsored discrimination since, at least, the 
1920s.444  Yet, despite the simplicity with which these factors justify the 
prohibition of sexual orientation–based peremptory challenges, J.E.B.’s 
limiting principle remains an obstacle.445  This obstacle is caused, 
principally, by its rigid application of the three-tiered system of judicial 
review.446 
2.  J.E.B.’s Limiting Principle Rigidly Applies 
Standards of Judicial Review in a Way That Fails to Consider 
the Factual Circumstances of Each Case 
J.E.B. rigidly utilizes the three-tiered system of judicial review applied in 
all Equal Protection cases to control Batson’s expansion.447  This section 
discusses how J.E.B.’s flawed limiting principle creates a legal fiction 
whereby race and gender are never constitutionally relevant to a juror’s 
ability to be impartial, and sexual orientation is always relevant.  It also 
demonstrates the ways in which this limiting principle is inconsistent with 
the spirit of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
No matter the basis of a discriminatory peremptory strike, or the level of 
judicial scrutiny applied to review it, the exerciser of a peremptory strike 
has the same compelling, important, or legitimate interest.448  This interest 
is in safeguarding a criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to an 
impartial jury.449  After Batson, regardless of the factual circumstances of a 
case, a race-conscious peremptory strike will never survive strict scrutiny as 
a narrowly tailored means of furthering this compelling interest.450  
Likewise, after J.E.B., gender-based explanations will never be thought to 
 440. See supra notes 265–69 and accompanying text. 
 441. See supra note 429 and accompanying text. 
 442. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 142 (1994). 
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 444. See supra notes 265–69 and accompanying text. 
 445. See supra notes 180–81 and accompanying text. 
 446. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 447. See supra Part I.C.1. 
 448. See J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143. 
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 450. See generally Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). 
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further this important interest under intermediate scrutiny.451  Both of these 
principles are supported by explanation and reasoning.452  J.E.B.’s limiting 
principle, on the other hand, was articulated without any justification. 
J.E.B.’s allowance of discriminatory peremptory strikes against some 
groups suggests that peremptory challenges based on characteristics 
defining groups entitled to rational basis review are always deemed 
rationally related to furthering the state’s legitimate interest.453  This, 
seemingly, cannot be true.  In light of the fact that sexual orientation does 
not bear on a juror’s fitness to serve, how can a sexual orientation–based 
strike rationally further the interest of impanelling an impartial jury, in say, 
an arson case?  In SmithKline, there was, at the very least, a rational 
stereotype-based argument that a homosexual juror may be biased against a 
company affecting the cost of HIV medication, considering the gay 
community’s historical relationship with the disease.454  In an arson case, 
by contrast, no similar rationality exists.  A homosexual juror seemingly 
would be no more or less likely to be partial than a heterosexual juror.  Yet, 
under Batson, sexual orientation is a permissible basis for peremptory 
dismissal in all but the Ninth Circuit.455 
Moreover, as Justice O’Connor articulates in her J.E.B. concurrence, this 
system fails to consider that race, gender, and other similar characteristics 
matter.456  Studies have shown that, in certain types of cases, one’s race, 
gender, and other characteristics truly do affect whether one votes to 
convict or not.457  Even without empirical studies, one need not be racist, 
sexist, or homophobic to infer that such defining characteristics would 
greatly impact, for example, a juror’s evaluation of an alleged hate crime 
against a member of a group to which the juror also belongs.458 
Simply stated, it is quite contradictory to say that, on the one hand, 
“jurors are not expected to come into the jury box and leave behind all that 
their human experience has taught them,”459 and, on the other hand, 
preclude litigants from considering the effects of human experience 
resulting from one’s race or gender.460  Justice O’Connor posited that this 
application of the three-tiered system of judicial review has created a legal 
fiction.461  As a matter of constitutional law, she stated, race and gender are 
never relevant when exercising peremptory strikes.462  This Note expands 
on that idea.  Not only are race and gender never relevant, but under the 
current Batson regime, sexual orientation is always relevant. 
 451. See generally J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 143. 
 452. See supra notes 111–35, 158–62 and accompanying text. 
 453. See supra notes 180–85 and accompanying text. 
 454. See supra Introduction. 
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 456. See supra note 399 and accompanying text. 
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Justice Scalia further illuminated the flaws of the Batson regime in his 
J.E.B. dissent, where he discussed the irrationality of the majority’s limiting 
principle.463  To him, it seemed as though there was no reason to conclude 
that a stereotype-motivated peremptory strike furthered a government 
interest only if the stereotyped person happens to be a member of a group 
entitled to mere rational basis review.464 
Justice Scalia’s discussion of the limiting principle highlights yet another 
inconsistency plaguing the Batson regime.  While Batson and J.E.B. 
expressly prohibit court-sponsored discrimination, J.E.B. also expressly 
sanctions it.  It forces one to consider whether the Equal Protection Clause 
is more faithfully served by the pre-Batson regime where all groups are 
subject to discriminatory peremptory strikes (as Justice Scalia argues) or the 
current regime where some groups are and others are not?465 
Further exasperating the unequal protection afforded certain groups under 
Batson is the current circuit split facilitated by J.E.B.’s limiting principle.  
The principle forces a court seeking to end court-sponsored discrimination 
of homosexuals first, independently to prove (as the Ninth and Second 
Circuits have) that homosexuals are entitled to heightened scrutiny.466  
Some courts, however, have simultaneously expressed the opinion that 
homosexuals should be entitled to heightened scrutiny and refused to apply 
the standard absent the Supreme Court’s endorsement.467  Other courts 
have argued that heightened scrutiny should not be applied.468  This is quite 
problematic. 
First, under the Supreme Court’s own four-part test, homosexuals 
seemingly constitute a quasi-suspect class.469  Second, for years, even 
absent the prerequisite quasi-suspect status, the Supreme Court has been 
applying a standard of review more rigorous than traditional rational basis 
to classifications involving homosexuals.470  The Supreme Court’s 
reluctance to define homosexuality as a suspect class is steadfast, however.  
Most recently, in Windsor III, the Supreme Court neither stated which level 
of scrutiny it was applying nor engaged in an analysis even resembling 
traditional rational basis review.471  Moreover, as Justice Scalia points out 
in his dissent, “The opinion does not resolve and indeed does not even 
mention what had been the central question in [the] litigation:  whether, 
under the Equal Protection Clause, laws restricting marriage to a man and a 
woman are reviewed for more than mere rationality.”472  As a result of the 
 463. See supra notes 401–07 and accompanying text. 
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Court’s avoidance of this issue, lower courts choosing to wait for the 
Supreme Court to define sexual orientation as a quasi-suspect class are 
stuck endorsing discrimination of homosexuals based on historically 
informed stereotypes, until the Court decides to address the question.473 
In sum, the problem precipitated by J.E.B.’s limiting principle is that a 
group that seemingly deserves Batson’s protection is entitled to such in only 
the Ninth Circuit and eligible for it in just one other.474  This “conflict of 
authority” is eerily similar to the one the Court meant to solve by granting 
certiorari in J.E.B.475 
B.   How Batson’s Holding Should Be Both Narrowed and Expanded 
While the stated criticisms of the Batson regime motivate this Note to 
suggest that Batson should be applied to prohibit sexual orientation–based 
peremptory strikes, as in the Ninth Circuit, it also recognizes that this would 
impermissibly burden a defendant’s ability to protect his Sixth Amendment 
right to an impartial jury.  For this reason, this Note suggests, not only that 
Batson be expanded but also that its holding be narrowed to re-empower the 
peremptory strike. 
1.   Proposed Limiting Principle 
First, this Note suggests that Batson’s protection should be afforded to 
groups defined by immutable characteristics that do not affect one’s 
competence as a juror.  Whereas the group a juror freely associates with 
may lead to logical inferences regarding their opinions and biases, 
immutable characteristics are not usually as informative.  Moreover, 
generalizations made on the basis of immutable characteristics are very 
often rooted in historical stereotypes.  The groups we freely associate with, 
on the other hand, provide factual bases for such group generalizations. 
This limiting principle would solve two problems.  First, by expanding 
Batson’s application to more groups, J.E.B. would no longer prevent Batson 
from prohibiting purposeful discrimination.  Second, by decoupling Batson 
from the three-tiered system of judicial review even those courts which 
apply rational basis review to sexual orientation classifications would be 
able to prohibit sexual orientation–based classifications. 
2.   Narrowing Batson’s Scope 
To compensate for the proposed expansion’s hindrance on a defendant’s 
ability to protect his Sixth Amendment right to an impartial jury, Batson’s 
first step should be altered.  This Note proposes that a prima facie case of 
intentional discrimination be established in only two circumstances. 
 473. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 474. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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First, a prima facie case of discrimination must be found where a pattern 
of peremptory strikes indicates that a group is being systematically 
excluded from the jury.  Succinctly justifying this prohibition, Justice 
Marshall stated, “[i]t is not necessary to assume that the excluded group 
will consistently vote as a class in order to conclude, as we do, that its 
exclusion deprives the jury of a perspective on human events that may have 
unsuspected importance in any case that may be presented.”476 
Second, a prima facie case of discrimination must also be found where 
(1) very convincing evidence of discrimination exists and (2) proving a 
“pattern” of strikes against a certain group is impossible because only one 
member of that group is present on the venire.  Such a system would 
necessarily allow a prima facie case to be found in a situation similar to that 
in SmithKline, where the only self-identified homosexual member of the 
venire was peremptorily stricken.477  The relationship of the gay 
community to HIV, along with counsel’s failure to ask any questions 
regarding other bases of exclusion, leads to the permissible inference, 
sufficient to establish a prima facie case, that his peremptory strike may 
have been motivated by the juror’s sexual orientation.478  While perhaps 
over-inclusive, this principle ensures that discrimination against a numerical 
minority on the venire does not go unchecked, and that a fair cross-section 
of the community may potentially include its minority members. 
By making it more difficult to establish a prima facie case of 
discrimination, it allows peremptory strikes to be exercised with more 
discretion.479  In doing so, it may be that a peremptory strike exercised on 
the hunch that a person’s race, gender, sexual orientation, et cetera has 
rendered him or her biased.  And admittedly, isolated instances of such 
would be unchallengeable.  Yet it is not certain or even probable that the 
number of discriminatory peremptory strikes detected by the court will be 
affected.  Without the strong systematic exclusion or pretext evidence this 
Note would require, it is likely the Court will accept any plausible reason 
for a strike, regardless of its truth or relevance.480 
Furthermore, this cost is certainly balanced by the benefit of extending 
Batson’s protection to several historically discriminated against groups that 
are not currently eligible for it.  In providing this protection, this resolution 
also re-empowers the peremptory strike by making an effective challenge 
less common and thereby restores some of the practice’s discretionary 
nature. 
CONCLUSION 
Consider again the example presented in the Introduction of this Note.  
When a Batson challenge was made following the peremptory strike of a 
 476. Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 503–04 (1972). 
 477. See supra Introduction. 
 478. See supra Introduction. 
 479. See supra note 398 and accompanying text. 
 480. See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
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suspected homosexual from the venire, the judge replied, “Well, I don’t 
know . . . whether Batson ever applies to sexual orientation.”481  In so 
stating, this judge expressed doubt whether court-sponsored discrimination 
on the basis of sexual orientation is permissible.  The answer to that 
question should clearly be:  “No.” 
Batson and subsequent cases flaunt the ideal that discrimination against 
jurors will not be tolerated, and yet it is.  It may be that voir dire 
proceedings are not effectively designed to render the reliance on “group 
stereotypes rooted in, and reflective of, historical prejudice” unnecessary.482  
It may be that discrimination is an unfortunate means to a necessary end.  
While the solution this Note proposes does not claim to solve all of these 
problems, it does solve one. 
In J.E.B., the Court, quoting Strauder, derisively described the allowance 
of peremptory strikes based on gender as “practically a brand upon 
[women], affixed by the law, an assertion of their inferiority.”483  Extending 
Batson to prohibit the exercise of peremptory strikes based on a juror’s 
sexual orientation, at the very least, eliminates this “brand” on the gay 
community. 
 481. SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 475 (9th Cir. 2014). 
 482. J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 128 (1994). 
 483. Id. at 141 (quoting Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 308 (1880)). 
 
